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Abstract	  
 
This master thesis analyses the relationship between the workers’ movement and civil society 
in Egypt within the time period from 1984 to 2013. Four different organisations are discussed 
from their early years of underground activities in one instance, participation in the mass-
movement during the 2011 revolution and its aftermath that led to the disintegration of the 
mass-movement. The sources for this analysis are books, reports, Internet resources, but not 
least first hand accounts through interviews. The interviews were conducted as part of the 
research for this thesis in Cairo and Mahalla al Kubra, and show a clear link between the 
workers’ movement, civil society and the revolution. The thesis is structured in two parts. The 
first part gives a general contextual background, and is about the history of the workers’ 
movement in Egypt and the second part is about four different civil society groups. 
Comparisons are drawn through a discussion on the services each group engages in, key 
individuals and the history of each organisation. The organisations analysed are the Centre 
For Trade Unions and Workers Services, The Association For the Protection of the 
Environment, The Democratic Front Party and the Salafiya Costa Movement. 
 
Key words: Workers’ movement, civil society, revolution, underground, Cairo, Mahalla al 
Kubra, Egypt, Social history. 
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On the 28th of January 2011 I went to downtown Cairo to see with my own eyes what was 
going on. My friends and I had heard rumours that there was a demonstration and this was 
supposedly a big one. The traffic was blocked so we decided to walk from Zamalek where we 
lived, across the 6th of October Bridge and into downtown and Tahrir Square. On the way we 
were joined by hundreds of mostly young people coming from the Giza side of the river Nile. 
Many of these people were shouting slogans and some of them were repeating the words 
intifada and thawra. The first word I understood and made the association to the two 
rebellions by the Palestinian people against Israeli rule in the past, but the other word I would 
later learn meant revolution and I was in the middle of it.  
 
When we came to the place where the Corniche turns towards the Egyptian Museum we saw 
that riot police blocked the street in both directions. As we walked on the pavement I could 
see the terrified faces of young police cadets with oversized helmets and shields. I could also 
see huge lieutenants in combat clothing shouting at the cadets and sometimes beating them. 
Across the street I could see the determined faces of the revolutionary crowd. We tried to 
enter Tahrir Square, but plain-clothed police stopped and questioned us and when they were 
done they escorted us to one of the riverboats and ordered the owner to ferry us back to 
Zamalek again.  
 
My friends and I had to bribe the ferryman to take us back to the downtown side of the river 
and thus we defied the order of the police. This time we ended up right between the Ramses 
Hilton Hotel and the Maspero building where the news company Aljazeera had their 
headquarters at the time. Aljazeera were filming the whole riot form the roof of the building 
and broadcasted live to the entire world. Now a fierce street battle was raging between the 
police and the revolutionaries. Stones were flying and teargas grenades were launched 
directly towards where we were standing. We had to run into the Ramses Hilton to escape the 
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teargas that choked us. After a while the revolutionaries broke into the hotel lobby to take 
shelter form the battle going on outside. Many took care of wounds and injuries, others had to 
wash teargas out of their eyes, and one small group knelt down and started praying, but most 
of them just took a break before they ran back outside to continue fighting.  
 
We decided to try to get out of the hotel because we felt we ought to get to a safer distance. 
Just as we came outside the police charged at a group of people standing close to us. We got 
out of their way and hoped they would ignore us. I could smell the sweat of the police as they 
ran past me. My friends and I then decided that the hotel was the safest available place for us 
at the time being after all, so we managed to get back in and stayed there until nightfall. By 
then the battle had subsided and later we learnt that the police had been defeated and the 
revolutionary crowd had managed to enter Tahrir Square. The Square was held for 18 days 
and resulted in the downfall of President Hosni Mubarak.  
 
This was the event that would inspire me to do research on the Egyptian revolution and learn 
more about its place within modern Middle Eastern history. As I learned more about the 
history of Egypt the role of the workers’ movement became clear to me, especially as a voice 
of contention against the state. The importance of the workers’ movement increased in the 
years leading leading up to the revolution. But to understand the role of the workers in the 
revolution one needs to look back to the establishment of a modern working class in late 19th 
and the 20th century.  
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Introduction	  
Egypt	  before	  the	  2011	  Revolution	  
For 30 years President Hosni Mubarak had ruled the country with the support by the Egyptian 
army, most of the international community and most importantly the USA. He had like his 
predecessors Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar al Sadat, built up a highly entrenched police 
state to protect him. Most of it was financed by aid and direct military support from the 
Americans. Egypt has been under martial law since 1967 except for a short period before the 
assassination of President al Sadat in 1981.   
 
The capital Cairo was one of the most policed places in the world under Mubarak. An 
estimated 50 000 to a 100 000 people served in the police force in Cairo alone, and this was 
just the normal uniformed police.1 The secret services, under the direct management of the 
Ministry of the Interior, spied on dissidents and troublemakers and it is impossible to know 
exactly how many agents they employed. The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) 
controlled the economy through the president’s son Gamal Mubarak and his close circle of 
investors and bankers. The national media, on television and in newspapers, fought amongst 
themselves to praise the President and his family, lifting them up to a semi-divine status.  
 
The political process was completely dominated by the closest friends of the president and he 
would appoint ministers and governors after his own taste without consulting any democratic 
instances or popular referendums. Workers were in a vulnerable position and there were no 
trade union federations that could speak for them.2 Since the regime of Abdel Nasser the state 
tried to force the workers’ movement under their control and this trend reached its height 
under Mubarak. By the late 1980s the Egyptian Federation of Trade Unions (EFTU) had 
become a “yellow union” that tried to supress the workers rather than fight for their rights.3 In 
the vernacular they were commonly known simply as “el hukuma”, or “the government” in 
English.4  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Rodenbeck Max. Cario – the City Victorius. 1998 London. P. 216. 
2 The Draft Law on Trade Unions. Published by the CTUWS. 08.03.2009. P. 8. 
3 A ”yellow union” is an expression describing a union that is in league with the management or the government.  
4 Interview, conducted by the author, with Gamal abo el Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in 
Mahalla al Kubra. January 2014.  
	   10	  
The Egyptian regime under Mubarak seemed to be relatively strong and stable both in the 
eyes of the regime itself, by the international media, and even by the opposition. The 
opposition was in a very difficult situation under Mubarak and the only kind of contestation 
that was accepted by the regime was of the kind that was too small to pose a real threat. Few 
experts on Egypt believed it was possible to fundamentally challenge the strength of the 
regime and even Joel Beinin, which is the source I have used the most in chapter one of this 
thesis, said as late as in 2010 that he did not think the strike movement that had been in Egypt 
since 2008 would be able to shake the foundation of the regime.5  
 
In this political climate it is hard to imagine that a thriving opposition could be established. 
However we know that on the grass root level the regime gradually lost control. There were 
many different groups of pioneers that paved the way for the emergence of a powerful 
revolutionary movement and some of these will be presented in this thesis. These groups were 
civil society actors in Egypt who despite the oppression were able to make some room for 
political activism underground or on the grass root level. Sometimes these groups would 
camouflage their activism as being aid or charity, but within this aid there would be an 
element of political protest.  
 
In the history of modern Egypt the types and titles of local leaders and mediators has changed 
with the times. In the semi-feudal system before the 1952 revolution it was the Omda who 
had this key position.6 After the monarchy was discarded the Mualim inherited the position 
from the Omda.7 Today key individuals in organisations and parties could be seen to resemble 
the Omda and the Mualim in that their central position between power structures is necessary 
in order to get anything done. Many ordinary people do not have the necessary skills to 
navigate this complex system. The reason these key individuals, these mediators, are so 
important in Egypt is that there are huge gaps in the services provided by the state, and the 
official bureaucracy is inefficient. In addition, the mediators are important for the 
development of civil society because they are the people who tend to initiate and manage 
organisations like the four chosen for this thesis. These mediators who work in different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Interview with Joel Beinin at Democracy Now. Published on 10.02.2011. 
http://www.democracynow.org/shows/2011/2/10          
6 Omda: A local chieftan who was a middle man between the farmers in the countryside and the land owning 
nobliity who lived in the city.  
7 Muallim: The word means teacher in Egyptian arabic. An informal leader of a neighbourhood, a community, or 
a crafts guild. The term is used in the Zabbalin commuity and the Mualimeen often is the mediators between the 
NGOs and the Zabbalin workers.  
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organisations, but with similar practices, are crucial for creating and sustaining the emerging 
civil society in Egypt.   
 
Since industrialisation started in Egypt in the late 19th early 20th centuries the workers’ 
movement has been an important source of inspiration for the greater oppositional movement. 
The workers demands have usually been about ‘bread-and-butter’ issues irrespective of 
whether they were dealing with repression and exploitation from the Turks, British colonial 
rule or later the independent Egyptian governments. 
 
Introducing	  civil	  society	  in	  Egypt	  
The organisations in this thesis have in common that they are results of a growing civil 
society in Egypt. Civil society is the public space between the state and the individual. This 
space can be organisations, networks, trade unions, and independent media for example. In 
other words civil society can be described as the glue that binds society together. According 
to Political Scientist Bruce R. Sievers from the University of Stanford civil society includes at 
least seven different factors or in his own words “strands”. These are: Nonprofit and 
voluntary institutions, individual rights, the common good, the rule of law, philanthropy, free 
expression and tolerance. These factors are widely used in research on modern civil society. 
Sievers’s point is that these aspects are interactive components that together create the 
necessary conditions for a functioning modern civil society.8  
 
One aspect of civil society is social movements that work to change within society. These 
organisations are sometimes reacting to the status quo and the hegemonic power in place at 
the time of their foundation. They are expressions of opposition. Civil society is thus the 
space in which ideas are formed and debated and possibilities emerge. 
 
The Egyptian revolution in 2011 was an energy injection to civil society, even if violence 
from the police and army has taken some of this energy away.9 Egyptians had started to 
believe that they could challenge the state and the army if they just organised and joined the 
public debate. Before the revolution there was a great sense of apathy when it came to joining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Sievers Bruce. Article: What is Civil Society? Published in GIA Reader Vol 20, No. 1. 2009.   
http://www.giarts.org/article/what-civil-society  
9 Sika Nadine. Article: Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt: The Road Not Yet Traveled. 2012. 
http://muftah.org/civil-society-and-democratization-in-egypt-the-road-not-yet-traveled/   
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the public debate. People felt all the important decisions were made in advance by the 
President and that the political process was just a charade to give the masses the impression 
that their opinion mattered. 
 
Many Egyptians became interested in politics for the first time during and after the revolution. 
They joined or created new organisations that aimed to ease the path toward democracy. The 
new organisations were of all denominations and ideologies from Islamist to Socialist. All of 
the organisations discussed in later chapters gained new members during and after the 
revolution. Lots of workers joined a union for the first time in their lives, others joined public 
pressure groups like the Salafiya Costa Movement or local political parties like the 
Democratic Front Party.  
 
Another sign that civil society was on the offensive was an explosion of street art and culture. 
Young artist would paint and give their accounts of the street fighting between the security 
forces and the revolutionaries. The narratives of the revolution were accounted for in the 
street art as the revolutionary youth commemorated their own martyrs in this way.10 The 
independent music scene also flourished during and after the 18 days in Their Square. The 
artists who sang in the sit-ins became some of the heroes for the young demonstrators.11 
These expressions of underground culture are some of the gains of the revolution and in the 
long run could have more influence than the immediate political gains.   
 
Since 2012 there has been a contra-revolution that has sought to de-radicalise the political 
situation. This was instigated when the elected president Mohammed Morsi granted himself 
sweeping powers in November 2012 and it was further strengthened by the army takeover in 
July 2013.12 Morsi wanted to declare the end of the revolution and make the youth that were 
still fighting the police in the streets give up and return to work. The government wanted to 
protect itself and feared the revolutionary potential of the crowds. After Morsi’s government 
was toppled by both popular pressure and military intervention the army continued this 
rhetoric. Publically calling protesters, unions and the Islamist movement troublemakers and 
terrorists, they sought to alienate these groups from the rest of the population. The army 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The Walls of Freedom: Reference to street art in Cairo. As viewed 10.05.2014. http://wallsoffreedom.com  
11 Ramy Essam: Singer who became famous during the revolution. As viewed 10.05.2014.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-rEKmTBKiBM  
12 Kouddous Sharif Abdel. What Led to Morsi's Fall—and What Comes Next? Article published in The Nation 
05.06.2013. http://www.thenation.com/article/175128/what-led-morsis-fall-and-what-comes-next#  
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started arresting people from oppositional groups and the escalation of violence led the army 
to kill around 1000 supporters of Morsi outside Rabaa al Adawiya Mosque on the 14th of 
August 2013.  
 
This massacre was a culmination of the contra-revolution. Many groups in society feared the 
revolutionary crowds and more importantly that their property would be harmed so they 
welcomed a return to the familiar political processes with a strong leader and a strong army. 
Essentially nobody in the establishment wants democracy in Egypt, because real democracy 
would mean that the millions of poor in the country actually would have power over the rich. 
It would mean a radical redistribution of the wealth of the nation and this is a more terrible 
prospect for the rich than continued dictatorship and the lack of basic freedoms. In fact the 
problem with democracy in Egypt is essentially the same as the ancient Greeks faced. The 
majority of the population in both Egypt and ancient Greece was poor and real democracy 
would mean that the few rich would have to give up their privileges. Very few people want to 
give away privileges when they first have enjoyed them. Nevertheless this is a precondition 
for real democracy according to Aristotle and it is perhaps the reason why real democracy 
remains a utopian model that have yet to be achieved.  
 
The conservative forces, like the army and the religious establishment, in Egypt have 
unsuccessfully tried to quell the emerging and revolutionary civil society. The strong energy 
created by the revolution is still remembered by everyone that experienced it. Even if some 
conditions have become worse than they ever were under Mubarak due to military repression 
and new restrictive protest laws, civil society continues to organise and engage people. 
 
Research	  Question	  	  
Because of my field work and my research on the workers’ movement in Egypt I have chosen 
the following research questions:  
 
How could the workers’ movement contribute to the rise of civil society that led to 25th 
of January revolution in 2011? How did other kinds of groups contribute in developing 
this civil society in Egypt? And finally, how did civil society respond when the mass-
movement fragmented after the revolution? 
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The first question will be discussed in chapter one of this thesis. This is an overview of the 
history of the workers’ movement in Egypt. Here the long lines of labour history are shown. 
The origin of the revolution in 2011 can be found in the history if the workers’ movement. It 
is interesting to see that it was basically the same things the workers fought for in 1910 as 
they did in 2011. The economic realities and distribution of wealth have remained fairly 
stable in Egypt. The owners of the land, the factory or the state employers dominate the 
economy while the peasants, the workers or the civil servant live in relative poverty without 
much hope of changing their situation to the better. 
 
In all time periods covered in this thesis there have been significant events of workers’ 
activism. I have chosen one event from each time periods to get closer to the workers 
themselves. Chapter one will go back to late Ottoman times when modern industrialisation 
was introduced to Egypt. The chapter will include parts about the colonial period under the 
British and the eras of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar al Sadat leading up to a quite detailed 
description of the age of Hosni Mubarak.    
 
Four different organisations or civil society actors are presented in chapters two to five and 
here the second and third research questions are discussed. Some of these groups had been 
active for a while when the revolution happened and some came about right before or during 
the revolution in 2011. Only one of these is a workers’ organisation, the others are focusing 
on helping other groups in society. The differences between the organisations are important in 
order to show the width of civil society actors, and to point out the fact despite the differences 
they do engage in similar practises. The focus in these chapters will be on the practices of the 
organisations, the key individuals that founded and led the organisations and on what 
happened with each organisation when they left the mass-movement.   
   
Introducing	  the	  History	  of	  the	  Workers’	  Movement	    
Pre-­‐Industrial	  labour	  history	  
In the late Ottoman period the urban artisan guilds were institutions that could mediate 
between the ruling classes on one hand and the artisan workers on the other. The guilds were 
interested in maintaining good trade conditions. The guild masters usually sought to prevent 
conflicts between apprentices and artisan masters. They had a harmony perspective and were 
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interested in preventing uprisings by the working apprentices, but in some instances the 
economic conditions became so bad that revolts could not be prevented. In these cases the 
guild leaders often assumed the role of strike leaders or mediators. 13 The apprentices had the 
same function in the artisan workshops that modern workers later would have in the emerging 
industry. They were the ones that actually made the merchandise that the workshop would 
sell. The artisan masters were the owners of the workshops and were managing business and 
overseeing the production. They had much the same function that employers would have in 
the industrial age. Apprenticeship was an education the apprentices gained while they were 
working for the master tradesman.14     
Colonial	  rule	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  modern	  working	  class	  	  
In 1882 British forces occupied Egypt to protect their interest and Khedive Tawfiq (1879-
1892) against a revolt led by the colonel Ahmed Urabi.15 Officially, Egypt remained a part of 
the Ottoman Empire until 1923 when it was replaces by the Turkish Republic. The Arab 
provinces were subsequently turned into protectorates or mandates under British or French 
administration in according to the Sykes/Picot Agreement.16 The British army supported and 
protected the royal family and the economic reforms designed to turn Egypt into a supplier of 
raw materials to the British Empire. In addition it was of great strategic importance for the 
British to keep control of the Suez Canal because it was the quickest route to India and the 
other Asian Colonies.     
Gama	  Abdel	  Nasser	  and	  the	  working	  class	  
Gamal Abdel Nasser was the leader of the Free Officers who took power after a military coup 
d’état in 1952.17 They made Egypt a Republic, and ended the hold that the royal family and 
the nobility had on the economy. The military junta of the Free Officers would later rename 
themselves as the Arab Socialist Union. From 1962 until 1974 this was the only legal political 
party in the country.18 Abdel Nasser wanted to free the Middle East and the Arabs by socialist 
reforms. Nationalizing the Egyptian economy and redistributing agricultural land became 
important elements in this process. For Abdel Nasser the military was the foundation his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Beinin Joel. Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East. Cambridge 2001. P. 37-38. 
14 Dictionary.com: reference to Apprentice. As seen 09.05.2014.  
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/apprenticeship  
15 Rogan Eugene. The Arabs – A History. London 2009 and 2011. P. 162. 
16 History.com: reference to the Sykes/Picot Agreement. As seen 09.05.2014. http://www.history.com/this-day-
in-history/britain-and-france-conclude-sykes-picot-agreement  
17 Encyclopedia Britannica: reference to Free Officers and Abdel Nasser. 
http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/180382/Egypt/22400/The-revolution-and-the-Republic#ref307102  
18 Rogan Eugene. The Arabs – A Hisotry. London 2009 and 2011. P. 414.   
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socialist state. The military would protect the Arab peoples by challenging the west and 
opposing the new state of Israel.   
 
Abdel Nasser portrayed himself as a protector of the working class and escalated the 
industrialisation program. Looking past this rhetoric, Abdel Nasser quelled any challenge that 
could pose a threat to his reign. He ordered the army to clamp down on the Muslim 
Brotherhood, worker activists and communists alike, despite calling himself a socialist. All 
attempts to organise independently were stopped before they could even start.  
Anwar	  al	  Sadat	  and	  the	  Open	  Door	  policy	  
Anwar al Sadat was the vice president under Gamal Abdel Nasser and naturally he took 
power as the former president had died on his post. Al Sadat had been in prison during the last 
world war under the suspicion of collaborating with the Germans. Many members of the 
nationalist movement hoped that the Germans would win the war and help them get rid of the 
British. Before the battle of El Alamein it even seemed plausible that they would at least win 
North Africa. After the war al Sadat became a member of the Free Officers, and although he 
and Abdel Nasser had different views on ideology he remained loyal to the president.19 Al 
Sadat used the legacy of Abdel Nasser to portray himself as a great leader. It took a few years 
before he officially changed his policy and turned his back on Arab Socialism. At the same 
time abandoned the one party system and allowed other parties to join the political process, he 
lifted the censorship of the media and even tolerated the Muslim Brotherhood.  
The	  independent	  workers’	  movement	  in	  opposition	  to	  Mubarak	  	  
Hosni Mubarak was the longest serving ruler of Egypt since Mehmet Ali Pasha (1805-1848). 
He came to power after al Sadat was assassinated in 1981 and continued and intensified the 
neo-liberal policies that affected ordinary workers in a negative way. In the 1980s the 
economy of Egypt showed systematic weaknesses because it had become too dependent on 
foreign aid and remittances from migrant workers the oil rich Gulf States.20 When the global 
oil prices dropped migrant workers had to return home to Egypt and this caused a currency 
crisis for the government.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Hourani Albert. A History of The Arab Peoples. London 1991.  P. 417. 
20 Soliman Samer. The Autumn of Dictatorship – Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt under Mubarak. 
Cairo 2006 and 2011. P. 114.  
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In the early 1980s the regime softened and some of the most repressive measures were 
dropped. Mubarak wanted to show that he was a man of democracy and modernity, and he 
therefore let oppositional groups emerge as long as they did not challenge him. In the 1990s 
the oppression from the state became more aggressive and this led to underground opposition 
within the workers’ movement. In the 2000s the workers’ movement became a more public  
voice in this opposition as they started to organise strikes that were not only about basic living 
conditions and wages but also of a greater political nature.21  
 
Introduction	  to	  four	  Egyptian	  organisations	  
In part two of this thesis four different Egyptian organisations will be discussed. This is in 
order to answer the second and third research question about the development of civil society. 
Comparisons will be made of how the organisations approach education, aid and other 
services. I have met with and interviewed people from these organisations and decided that 
they make interesting subjects for comparison. I think the similarities in practice are more 
important than the differences in goals and structures of each organisation.  
 
The organisations are all civil society actors in Egypt and that makes them relevant in order to 
answer the research questions. Another common factor is that three out of four organisations 
in this thesis are working with Coptic issues in some way and in varying degree. Therefore a 
quite detailed introduction to Coptic history has been included. However this thesis is not a 
study of Coptic history but a study of the workers’ movement and civil society in Egypt.  
Introduction	  to	  Centre	  for	  Trade	  Unions	  and	  Workers	  Services	  
The Centre for Trade Unions and Workers Services is a fundamental part of the workers’ 
movement in Egypt. The organisation is the most central research subject in this thesis. It is 
an Egyptian non-governmental organisation that aims to improve the conditions of workers 
and fight for the right to organise independent unions. The organisation was established in 
March 1990. The founders of the CTUWS committed themselves to doing something about 
the urgent need for independent unions in Egypt and they decided to adopt some fundamental 
principles for the organisation.22 Firstly, it was to be organised in a democratic manner and all 
board members had to be elected by general assembly. Secondly they should cooperate with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Interview with Gamal abo el Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in Mahalla al Kubra. 
20.01.2014. 
22 The Draft Law on Trade Unions. Published by the CTUWS. Cairo 08.03.2009. P 77.  
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the workers on the grass root level and provide direct services to fill the void created by the 
official trade union structure.23  
 
The CTUWS was founded in Hilwan, which is one of the main industrial areas south of Cairo. 
In the course of the 1990s the CTUWS opened new branch offices in Mahalla al Kubra, Nag 
Hammadi and 10th of Ramadan City as well as new headquarters in Downtown Cairo. The 
CTUWS has functioned as a fully-fledged trade union, organising workers locally and 
offering services that normally are associated with a functioning trade union, offering legal 
support, information work and organising sales cooperatives.   
 
The CTUWS had an adversarial position toward the official union structure since it was 
founded, which in practice functioned like an arm of the state.24 As a result their members 
have been harassed by the authorities and arrested for their activism. In the strike wave that 
developed in between 2003 and 2009 the CTUWS was active in organising actions against lay 
offs and cuts in welfare for workers. The CTUWS Mahalla was especially active in 
organising large strikes in 2006 and 2008. These strikes were later seen as preludes to the 
revolution in 2011. 
Association	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Environment	  	  
The Associations for the Protection of the Environment is an important actor in Egyptian civil 
society. It is a non-governmental organisation that works to better the conditions of the 
Zabbalin community in Cairo. The APE was founded in 1984 in Manshiyat Naser primarily 
as an environmental organisation, but the founders realised that bettering the living conditions 
of the Zabbalin was the only way to improve the environment in the slum in Manshiyat 
Naser.25 Soeur Emmanuelle, Mourner Namatella and Yousriya Loza Sawiris are considered to 
be the founders of the APE.  They played a major role in modernising the handling of the 
trash that the Zabbalin collect. They opened the first modern compost plant in Egypt as well 
as industrialising much of the recycling work that the Zabbalin used to do by hand.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 23 Ctuws.com: Under the headline About US. As seen 08.03.2014. http://www.ctuws.com/about/story/?item=7  
24 The Draft Law on Trade Unions. Published by the CTUWS. Cairo 08.03.2009. P 10-11.  
25 Wendy Walker. The Torah Zabbaleen – From Shacks to High Rises. Cairo 2005. P. 7.  
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The APE opened a paper factory, a rug factory and a plastic recycling plant in Manshiyat 
Naser during the 1980s. In addition to the production facilities, they also opened a cultural 
centre, a health station and a school for the Zabbalin.26  
The	  Democratic	  Front	  Party	  
It is not just organisations and social movements that constitute civil society in Egypt. 
Oppositional political parties are also important because they stand as alternatives to the 
hegemonic state and the existing power structures. The next example of emerging civil 
society is a relatively young and small party. Seeing past the political activism of this party, in 
practise, they too share important similarities with the other three organisations. The 
Democratic Front Party was a liberal, secular political party in the middle of the political 
spectrum.27 It supported the neo-liberal economic strategy of the state until the revolution 
came in 2011. Before the revolution they were anti-Muslim Brotherhood, but during the 
revolution they supported the electoral alliance that the Freedom and Justice Party was a 
member of.28After the revolution the DFP went back to being anti-Brotherhood. The DFP was 
pragmatic when it came to join political alliances. When the DFP had the same agenda as the 
Brotherhood during the revolution it had no problem supporting them in elections.  
 
The DFP organised events they called Freedom Festival that was in engaged in social work to 
help poor people in Cairo. Their practices were to offer free education, basic aid and 
democracy lessons to people living in the slums. In many ways its practices were similar to 
the services provided by APE. After the revolution the DFP merged with the Egypt Bloc of 
Muhammad el Baradei, and it ceased to exist as an independent political party although the 
social projects continued in the slums.   
Salafiya	  Costa	  Movement	  	  
The final civil society organisation in this thesis differs from the APE and the CTUWS in 
many ways. It is organised differently and has different goals. However, it shares important 
similarities in practice and it has been an interesting voice in the emerging civil society. The 
Salafiya Costa Movement is an organisation that aims to improve the relations between the 
different religious groups in Egypt. They are an anti-sectarian and revolutionary group that 
came together during the revolution in 2011. The founders of this organisation are the Salafi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ape.org.eg: Under the headline Institutional. http://www.ape.org.eg/ThePrograms.html    
27 Interview by the author with Joseph Nessim in Cairo. 20.03.2013.  
28 The Freedom and Justice Party: The politcal party of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
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Mohammed Tolba and the Copt Bassem Victor. The SCM is the youngest organisation in this 
thesis, and the founders were inspired by the unity of the people during the 18 days in Tahrir 
Square to work to decrease religious tensions in the country. The SCM was organised in 
committees and the Street Committee and the Freedom Committee ran the social projects.    
In addition to their anti-sectarian ideological work the SCM also started social projects to help 
the poor people of Cairo. They gave basic aid and services, such as food, clothes and basic 
education, to people that had no access to these services normally.29     
 
The social project became the most important contribution of the SCM. They tried to enter 
into dialogue with the other civil society actors during the constitutional efforts that were 
being attempted between 2011 and 2013 and representatives of the SCM were invited to the 
constitutional hearing in the summer of 2012. After the military coup in July 2013 the SCM 
withdrew from politics because of the escalation of violence. Although they withdrew form 
the political process they continued their social projects. 
Introduction	  to	  Coptic	  history	  and	  the	  Zabbalin	  
The Copts are a Christian minority in Egypt constituting between 10 and 15% of the 
population.30 The word comes from the fact that the ancient Greeks used to call the people in 
Egypt for Aegiptoi. The Arabic derivative of Aegyptoi became Qibt and this has in turn been 
westernised into Copt.31 Before the Arab conquest of Egypt by Amr Ibn al As in the 7th 
century, Egypt was a part of the Eastern Roman Empire controlled from Constantinople. At 
the time of the Arab conquest there was a conflict between the Coptic Christians and the 
Greek Orthodox Christians. This can be described as a conflict between the faith of the local 
people and the faith of the state.32 When the Arab expansion reached Egypt the population 
more or less welcomed the defeat of the Roman Army and the removal of the Greek Bishop. 
This was some of the reason why the Arabs managed to conquer Egypt with relative ease.  
 
After the Arabs took over Egypt it took about 200 years before the Muslim population 
became larger than the Christian. Since the 9th century the majority of the population has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Interview with Soha Ali and Bassem Victor in the SCM office. 22.03.2013 in Cairo. 
30 The numbers of Copts in Egypt is uncertain. The previous Pope Shanuda III confirmed in 2008 that there were 
12 million Copts in Egypt.    
31 Encyclopedia Britannica: Internet article about Coptic history. As viewed 19.03.14. 
http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/136928/Coptic-Orthodox-Church-of-Alexandria  
32 This conflict had its root in the Council of Chalcedon when the monophysite doctrine was rejected in the 2nd 
Century. There was a schism between the religion of the Roman state (Greek Orthodox) and other orthodox 
churches. The Coptic Church was one of them.  
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Sunni Muslims, but the Coptic Christians were important to the Arab rulers and they often 
had high positions as administrators or scribes to the Sultans. During the Shiite Fatimid 
Caliphate there was an alliance between the Caliph and the Roman Emperor against the 
Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad.33 There was a great need of diplomats who could read and 
write Greek in this period and the Copts were ideal for this purpose. After Salah el Din retook 
Egypt for Sunni Islam in 1171 the Copts continued to be important subjects of the Ayubid and 
the Mamluk Sultanates and later the Ottoman Empire.34  
 
In the modern age from the 19ht century onwards, the Copts were important in the nationalist 
movements against both the Turks and the British. There were several Copts in the circle 
around the nationalist leader Saad Zhagloul Pasha in the years leading up to the 1918 
revolution. In fact the second prime minister of Egypt was a Copt named Youssef Wahba 
Pasha who served between 1919 and 1920.35 Between the two World Wars the role of the 
Copts was important for Egypt, after the 1954 revolution, and during the reforms of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, both the Coptic Church and the Coptic population joined his nation-building 
project.36  
 
The Coptic Pope was an important ally of the secular state and the Socialist president Abdel 
Nasser. In return for this loyalty the state made the Pope the main spokesperson and the leader 
of the Coptic population in general. The Pope was the one who negotiated with the state and 
mediated when there were conflicts about religious issues both with the Muslims and among 
the Copts themselves. In other words the state made the Church the sole representative of all 
the Copts in religious matters. The state did much the same with the religious learned of al 
Ahzar University.37 Al Ahzar University was founded around 970 AD and it is currently one 
of the foremost learning institutions in Sunni Islam and in the Arabic language.38 Since 1961 
they have accepted non-religious studies on their curriculum. Like the Coptic Pope the Grand 
Sheik of al Ahzar became the most important representative of all the Sunni Muslims in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Between the 9th and the 11th centuries. 
34 Ayubid Dynasty 1171-1250 AD, Mamluk Dynasty 1250-1517 AD, Ottoman Empire 1517-1922 AD.   
35  Kamal Katba 2007.The Egyptian Chronicles: Webpage about modern Egyptian History. As viewed on 
18.03.14.  http://www.theegyptianchronicles.com/History/PRIMEMINISTERS19.html  
36 Osman Tarek. Egypt on the Brink – From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak. London and New Haven 
2011. P. 61.   
37 Osman Tarek. Egypt on the Brink – From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak. London and New Haven 
2011. P. 61.   
38 Encylopedia Britannica: Internet article about about al Azhar University. As viewed 19.03.14. 
http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/46851/al-Azhar-University     
	   22	  
Egypt. This was a strategy implemented by the state to gain control over the religious 
communities in the country.    
 
This trend continued under the rule of Anwar al Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. As a reaction to 
the State/Church alliance a schism emerged between the young and the old generations in the 
last decade under Mubarak in the 2000s. The young Copts viewed themselves as Egyptians 
first and foremost and did not agree that the Pope should be able to negotiate with the state in 
matters concerning them. The state tried to deal with the religious communities separately and 
by doing so it laid the foundation for the sectarian conflict that would emerge later. During 
the government of Mohammed Morsi many Copts feared more discrimination from the state 
with an Islamist president. Most of them supported the army in deposing the government of 
Morsi in July 2013.   
 
Even if some Copts have had important positions in modern Egyptian society most of them 
have been poor and made up a large part of the informal labour force in the country. One 
important example of this is their function in trash processing in Cairo. The Zabbalin are the 
trash collectors in and around Cairo. The word is derived from zabbal, which is the Arabic 
term for trash. Before the term Zabbalin became in popular use, the trash collectors were 
called Wahaya, which means “people of the oasis”. The Wahaya came from the Dakhla Oasis 
in the early 1900s and made a living in an area of Cairo called Bab el Bahr. The Wahaya 
started by collecting waste form the households in Cairo and the dried and sold it for fuel to 
run the Turkish baths in the city.  
 
In the 1930s fuel oil replaced organic waste in Egypt so the Wahaya needed some other way 
to get rid of the organic waste. They went into business with pig-breeders called the Zarraba. 
The Wahaya became middlemen between the Zarraba and the house owners where the trash 
was collected and they made the most money. A hierarchical relationship developed between 
the Wahaya and the Zarraba. This relationship led to exploitation and sometimes abuse of the 
Zarraba, but the public did not know the difference between the two groups so they just called 
all of them Zabbalin meaning garbage people.39 The term has evolved into being a description 
of an occupation and a socio-economic group.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Wendy Walker. The Torah Zabbalin – From Shacks to High Rises. P. 13. 2005. Cairo.      
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In the 1970s the Zabbalin were forced to move from Imbaba on the Giza side of the river 
Nile, to Torah, Moqqatem and Manshiyat Naser. Here they set up tin shacks and lived without 
basic amenities like clean water. Their settlements grew to become slums, with the associated 
diseases, fire hazards and generally appalling conditions. The government let the Zabbalin 
stay at these settlements, but they did not let them lease the land and so there was always 
insecurity as to whether the government would chase them away.  
 
In 1976 the Governorate of Cairo and the World Bank planned a project to improve the 
conditions for the poorest inhabitants of the city, including the Zabbalin. The project was to 
be led by local forces supported by the Coptic Church, the Maadi Women’s Guild and the 
French nun Soeur Emmanuelle among other organisations. The project would take about 10 
years, but in 1984 electricity and sewage had been introduced. This was the first step towards 
betterment of the situation the Zabbalin lived in. In 1984 Yousriya Loza-Sawiris, Mounir 
Namentella and Soeur Emmanuelle founded the Association for the Protection of the 
Environment. Many Copts feel that there should be close ties within the community even if 
the different members belong to different social strata. In this way civil society has been able 
to develop both within a religious community of Copts and in the precise geographical area of 
Manshiyat Naser.     
 
          
Sources	  
Primary	  Sources	  and	  Source	  Critique	  
My	  own	  background	  and	  fieldwork	  
My academic interest in Egypt began when I started the Middle Eastern history program at 
the University of Bergen. I decided to take one semester as an exchange student at the AUC in 
the spring of 2011. As described in the prologue I soon found my self in the middle of a 
revolution and my studies in Egyptology at AUC became less interesting than what was going 
on around me. After completing my studies at the AUC I went back to Norway, but have 
returned to Egypt whenever possible. I decided to research modern Egyptian history focusing 
on grass root history, social movements, and eventually, the workers’ movement. In March 
2013 I conducted my initial fieldwork for this thesis and managed to get several interviews. In 
January 2014 I returned to Cairo for follow up interviews. I understand and speak very basic 
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Egyptian Arabic although not so good that I could do interviews in Arabic without 
interpreters. Therefore all the interviews are either conducted in English or with an interpreter 
present.  
Method	  and	  Ethics	  
Most of the research in this thesis was conducted during fieldwork in Cairo in March 2013 
and January 2014 and the most important method used to collect data during this fieldwork 
was interviews. These interviews are the most interesting primary sources in this thesis and 
they include the most detailed information about the issues I explore. The question whether to 
name people or not arises when dealing with interviews as sources. To be able to name the 
interviewee gives strength to the empirical evidence and it makes the research more 
reproducible. On the other hand there is risks involved in publishing the names of 
interviewees. One has to consider if naming them could be dangerous, such as if the 
information could be used against them later. This is especially important in the actual context 
of this thesis. The state of Egypt still prosecutes actors in civil society and many have been 
sent to prison. Prison sentences and conditions are harsh. There are also rumours of secret 
police arresting, abducting and torturing activists.  
 
On the other hand the wishes of the interviewees has to be considered. All the interviewees 
that are named gave their explicit permission. They were aware of the risk and they still felt 
that it was important to be named in this thesis. Some interviewees even described being 
named here as part of their activism. Another argument for using the names is that almost all 
the interviewees appear as representatives for their organisation not as private persons. They 
are describing the views of the organisations, not their personal opinions. In addition, some of 
my interviewees are public figures. Their contribution to this thesis is not likely to pose any 
additional risk to them than they are already exposed to through their own political activism. 
Summing up, I have decided to name some of the interviewees, but not all of them. I have 
therefore withheld the identities of some who wished to be anonymous.  
Interviews	  with	  Fatma	  Ramadan	  
The author conducted two interviews with Fatima Ramadan, one on the 24th of March 2013 
and one on the 14th of January 2014. Both of them were conducted in the offices of the Centre 
for Trade Unions and Workers Services (CTUWS) in Cairo. The interviews give an inside 
perspective of the history of the independent workers’ movement. The CTUWS has been a 
registered NGO in Egypt since 1990 and it has worked as a mediator between the workers and 
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the government as well as a coordinator between the different unions and strike committees 
that were active in this period.     
 
I use these interviews as a primary source to the activities of the Centre for Trade Unions and 
Workers Services because Fatma Ramadan works for there. She has around 20 years of 
experience with workers’ issues and she has been a participant in most of the events she 
describes in the interviews. The most important events are strikes and demonstrations for 
workers’ rights from around 2005 until 2013. The main issues of the CTUWS are health 
insurance for the workers they represent, recognition of the union, to improve wages and 
safety at work, but most importantly against the privatisation of their work place. 
 
She mentioned the tax collectors’ strike in 2006 and the Mahalla strikes on the 6th of April 
2008 as important events in the development of an independent workers’ movement. A 
weakness with this source is that the interviewee has a personal vested interest in portraying 
some events in particular ways. She has a positive bias toward the workers’ movement and 
may want to attribute a greater role to it in historic events than it actually had. Another 
problem with these sources is that Fatma Ramadan worked for two organisations at different 
stages and she did not always make it clear which one she talked about. Many times in the 
interview she just said, “we did” this and that without explaining who exactly “we” where. 
The interview was conducted in Arabic and there was an interpreter present.      
Interviews	  with	  Abdullah	  al	  Senawy	  	  	  
The author conducted two interviews with al Senawy, the first one was on the 26th of March 
2013 and the second one was on the 12th of January 2014. These interviews provides a 
perspective on the activities of the National Coalition for Change, popularly called the Kefaya 
movement, and the Journalist Syndicate where the interviewee was a participant. Al Senawy 
is also an Arab Socialist intellectual and used to work as editor of the Nasserite newspaper al 
Arabi al Nasseri.    
 
Al Senawy provides both a first hand account and a journalistic perspective on the events that 
preluded the revolution in 2011. He also raises the view to a broader regional perspective by 
talking about the inheritance of power between Hafez al Assad and his son Bashar al Assad in 
Syria in 2000 and the participation of Egypt in the war with Iraq on the side of the US led 
coalition in 2001-2003 as major factors leading up to the revolution.  
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The mains strength of the interviews with al Senawy is that it acknowledges the importance of 
the workers’ movement in the years leading up the revolution and in bringing down the 
regime of Hosni Mubarak. These interviews cover events in the early 2000s and mention both 
media campaigns against the government and demonstrations organised by the Kefaya 
movement. Al Senawy was a participant in one of the first openly critical demonstrations 
against President Mubarak and he said that the 300 demonstrators were surrounded by around 
10 000 riot police to prevent the numbers of demonstrators from growing. The interviews 
with al Senawy are also my only primary sources that provided some theoretical perspectives 
on why the revolution occurred by describing the huge difference between the poor and the 
rich as a classical class struggle.      
 
These interviews were conducted in Arabic and an interpreter was present, but we also spoke 
in English. As a self-declared socialist, Abdullah al Senawy belongs to a specific political 
wing, and has a vested interest in portraying the revolution and the years leading up to the 
revolution in a certain way. These interviews provided useful background information about 
the general struggle for rights and democracy in Egypt in the decades leading up to the 
revolution in 2011. 
Interviews	  with	  Joseph	  Nessim	  
The author conducted this interview on the 20th of March 2013 in the offices of the 
Democratic Front Party. It gives an inside view on the activism of a local political party in a 
revolutionary setting. Nessim is also a construction engineer and a member of the Engineering 
Syndicate. This is the perspective of a self-declared liberal democrat and a secularist.       
 
This interview is a primary source of the formation of the Democratic Front Party and the 
Muslim Brotherhoods (MB) takeover of the Engineering Syndicate is a major strength. 
Nessim, like al Senawy, affirms the importance of the workers in the revolution both as an 
inspiration for and as a participant in the demonstrations that brought down the regime of 
Mubarak.  
 
A challenge with this source is that the interviewee makes some highly controversial 
statements. He described the Muslim Brotherhood as the primary problem in Egypt today and 
that religious fundamentalist destroys democracy. He says, “Egypt is in a slow burning war 
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with the Muslim Brotherhood”. Nessim in not neutral, but finds himself in the midst of a war 
between the secular, modern Egypt and the tyrannical Brotherhood. Unfortunately this source 
has no details about the independent workers’ movement. The interview with Joseph Nessim 
was conducted in English with no interpreter present.     
Interview	  with	  Soha	  Ali	  and	  Bassem	  Victor	  
This interview was conducted on the 26th of March 2013 in the office of the Salafiya Costa 
Movement. Ali and Victor are activists in the Salafiya Costa Movement, which they define as 
a pressure group against the government. They also work with combating religious oppression 
and building bridges between the different religions in Egypt. Their members are both 
Salafists and Copts. The Copt Bassem Victor is one of the founding members of the 
organisation together with Mohammed Tolba who is a Salafist.   
 
This interview provides some detailed perspectives on the events that led up to the revolution. 
Ali and Victor speak about the poverty issues and what the movement is doing about it. 
Salafiya Costa Movement provides food and medicine to many poor neighbourhoods. The 
movement seems quite well organised and they have different elected committees that 
perform specific tasks. Some of the members of the movement were also involved in the 
Kefaya Movement and the 6th of April Movement before this revolution and that indicates 
that they were involved in workers’ protests.  
 
The Salafiya Costa Movement has never been directly involved in the workers’ movement, 
but some of the members are workers and used to support the strikes in Mahalla al Kubra in 
2008 and 2009. The interview is not specifically about labour issues and some of the answers 
were short and unclear with little detail and too much general information. However, this 
interview shows clearly that people have multiple roles, and is therefore a good source on 
linking this movement with workers’ organisations. 
 
A weakness with this source is brief answers – they do not expand much on their replies and 
are more concerned with ideology and inter-religious relations. This source has a minority-
perspective and cannot be said to represent the view of ordinary Egyptians. However, the 
source provides a good example of how to unite agendas and put differences aside. The 
interview was conducted in English, without interpreter. The group has gained international 
popularity and has been engaged in conferences and workshops abroad. The SCM might thus 
	   28	  
be seen to have operated on several different levels simultaneously in that it was involved at 
grass root level as well as the national and international levels. The group’s members are well 
educated and are keen to do something for the poor and to have a say politically.  They are 
upper middle class people providing charity to the poor, and this might be problematic when 
it comes to issues of representation, as a contrast to the workers’ movement that is organised 
for and by workers.  
Interview	  with	  Nicole	  Assaad	  
This interview was conducted on the 20th of March 2013 in the Association for the Protection 
of the Environment (APE) house in Manshiyat Naser where the Zabbalin community live and 
recycle the trash they collect. This interview is a primary source to the history of the APE. 
Nicole Assaad gives a detailed account of the history of the Zabbalin and the formation of the 
APE in the early 1980s.  
 
For my purpose the interview serves as an insight to the conditions of informal labour in 
Egypt and to the practices of the APE. The Zabbalin used to be uneducated and did not have 
proper working conditions. They normally worked without contracts, insurance, safety 
equipment and they did not have access to union membership. In many cases the activities of 
the APE matches the way the independent unions and other social movements work. Like the 
unions the APE has helped the Zabbalin to get health insurance, legal documentation and 
educate them about their rights. I would say, on the basis of this source, that the APE provide 
union-like services. This is one of the strengths of this source, that it gives information about 
people on the fringes of working life in Egypt. They do not have a strong voice like the 
workers in the formal labour sector. This source does not give information about the labour 
struggle or the workers’ movement and therefore it is only relevant as an additional 
perspective on the informal labour and as a source to the APE. 
 
Nicole Assaad is a native Frenchwoman and a naturalised Egyptian. She works as a volunteer 
with the APE and as an English teacher in a primary school in Cairo. She has a vested interest 
in portraying the APE as positively as possible and she does not have a critical perspective on 
the role of the organisation in the Egyptian community. In her view there was nothing but a 
slum in Manshiyat Naser before the APE came and gave the Zabbalin a chance to improve 
their lives. The leadership of APE was quite close to the personal circle around the Mubarak 
family and the present and the former chairpersons used to be Members of Parliament. Nicole 
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Assaad is a close personal friend of these former MPs. The interview was conducted in 
English and no interpreter was needed.  
Interview	  with	  Said	  Habib,	  Gamal	  abo	  al	  Alaa,	  Ibrahim	  Hamdi	  and	  Yaser	  Sakkah	  	  
This interview was conducted on the 20th of January 2014 in the office of the syndicate for 
retired workers and in the CTUWS branch office in Mahalla al Kubra. I use this interview as a 
primary source to the practices of the CTUWS locally and to the role of Mahalla al Kubra in 
the Egyptian workers’ movement.     
 
This interview is one of the most important sources in the whole thesis. It gives very good 
insight in both the political struggle of the workers’ movement and the day-to-day activities of 
the CTUWS locally. The workers of Mahalla al Kubra organised large strikes in 2006 and 
2008 and these has been considered as preludes to the revolution in 2011.   
 
The four workers interviewed are living legends in the workers’ movement in Egypt. In 
particular, Said Habib and Gamal abo al Alaa have both paved the way for workers activism 
in Egypt today. Few people have better insight in the development of the workers’ movement 
in Egypt than these two individuals.  
 
That being said, they are not neutral when it comes to describing the workers’ movement. 
They have a vested interest in portraying the CTUWS Mahalla in a certain way and this is far 
from objective. Their view on the management of the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company 
is a good example of this. They told me that they fought to get rid of the old director and as a 
response the government promoted him, in turn the workers answered by taking over the 
factory and now run it by themselves. “The director is only a chair now” they told me.40 In 
other words he has become obsolete in the actual management of the factory.  
 
This interview was conducted in two sessions. The first was in the office of the syndicate for 
workers over sixty and the second one in the office of the CTUWS Mahalla. I had to wait for 
the second part until the activists finished work in the factory at 4 pm. An interpreter was 
present during this interview as it was conducted in Arabic.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Interview, conducted by the author, with Gamal abo el Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in 
Mahalla al Kubra. January 2014.  
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Secondary	  Sources 
Historical and political science literature has been key for this thesis. I have read and used a 
wide variety of books and this is a presentation of the most important sources. Three of 
thesebook are either authored or co-authored by Joel Beinin. Workers and Working Classes in 
the Middle East – Struggles, Histories and Historiographies from 1994 is edited by Zachary 
Lockman, and Joel Beinin has contributed with an article about the 1977 Bread riots. Workers 
and Peasants in the Modern Middle East from 2001 is written by Joel Beinin and gives a 
detailed account of the history of workers in Egypt and other countries in the region. Social 
Mobilization and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa from 2011 is edited by 
Beinin and Frederic Vairel. This book looks at several examples of social protest from the 
whole region from Morocco to Turkey.  
 
The major strengths of these three books that they give detailed perspectives on workers’ 
protests and social struggles in Egypt. A weakness is that they are regional in focus and that 
only some parts of them are relative to this thesis. The books describe in detail several strikes 
and examples of class conflict in Egypt form the early 20th century until the era of Mubarak. 
Another strength is that the authors, including Joel Beinin are some of the foremost experts on 
labour history in the Middle East. Another weakness is that these sources are far form neutral 
because most of the authors are biased in favour of the workers’ movement. Beinin is clearly 
sympathetic to the workers’ cause. However, he also criticises the practices and the ideologies 
of the workers’ movement as being to little concerned with linking social to political 
demands.  
 
Most of the secondary sources were used in Chapter 2, which is an account of the history of 
the workers’ movement in Egypt. Class Conflict in Egypt 1945-1970 from 1973 by Mahmoud 
Hussein and Egypt on the Brink – From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak from 2011 
by Tarek Osman are two of these sources. The first of these two were used as a source to the 
sub chapter on the 1967-68 riots and the second was used as a source to the subchapters of 
Abdel Nasser and Sadat. I have used several other books about the history of the Middle East 
such as The History of the Arab Peoples by Albert Hourani and The Arabs A - History by 
Eugene Rogan as reference works.  
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Reports	  
The reports I have used as sources for this thesis provide important information about 
workers’ conditions and struggles in modern Egyptian history. The most important is the one 
called Justice for all – The Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt by Joel Beinin. Another 
important report is called Occupational Safety and Health in Egypt – A National Profile 
which accounts for the many shortcomings on those topics in the country.   
Occupational	  Safety	  and	  Health	  in	  Egypt	  –	  A	  National	  Profile	  
This report in accredited to the Egyptian Gehad A. Abo el Ata. It is published by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 2005 and it is concerned with, as the title shows, 
the condition of occupational safety and health in the Egyptian workplace. The report goes 
into details about the lack of basic provisions for workers in Egypt. Major themes in the 
report are labour laws, international law, low wages, and lack of collective bargaining, health 
insurance and protection. The report shows the shortcomings of the state in providing good 
conditions for workers in Egypt and it presents good statistics of how the situation actually is. 
Both Egyptian and international researchers collaborated to create this report and this adds to 
its academic credibility. 
 
The report criticises the government’s efforts to enforce the international agreements it has 
signed concerning workers’ rights. Both the UN Declaration of Human Rights, gives people 
the right to organise freely, and the conventions of the ILO are being broken every day even if 
the government is obligated to follow it. The Egyptian government participated and aided the 
researchers in creating this report. One major strength of this report is that it takes into 
account the whole country, not just the Cairo area, as is usual in about Egypt.  
 
One problem with this source is that it is produced by the ILO, which is not neutral when 
describing the conditions for workers in Egypt. It has a specific agenda in showing the poor 
conditions in the country. However the collaboration of the Egyptian government in this 
report can also be problematic in this report. To what extent can the data provided by the 
Mubarak government be trusted?  
Justice	  for	  all	  –	  The	  struggle	  for	  Worker	  Rights	  in	  Egypt	  
The report was written by Joel Beinin and published by the Solidarity Centre in Washington 
DC in 2010. This is a non-profit organisation that works with documenting the conditions of 
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labour struggles all over the world. The Solidarity Centre has also published reports about 
China, Mexico and South Korea to mention some of them.  
 
This report is one of my main sources both in the background chapter and in my analysis 
because it shows a detailed perspective on the struggles for the right to organize freely and the 
existence of the independent union movement. The first chapter of this report is the basis for 
my own background chapter. The main focus is the Mubarak years and the increasingly 
predatory state towards the workers movement. The historic background chapter is quite 
detailed and explains how the old unions were co-opted by the government since the reign of 
Abdel Nasser until today. The report documents the strike wave that occurred between 2004 
and 2009. The last time Egypt witnessed a similar strike wave was the late 1940s, and the 
years leading up to the 1952 revolution.   
 
This report deals precisely with my research topic and is full of relevant statistics and analysis 
by both Egyptian and foreign academics. New perspectives on relevant issues like 
discrimination in the workplace and manager’s policies of making illegal employment 
permanent contracts with the workers. Both of these issues are illegal in theory, but in practise 
it is commonplace according to this report. Like the report by the ILO, this one also verifies 
the lack of the right to bargain collectively as a major problem for the workers movement in 
Egypt.  
 
The most important weakness of this source is that it is far from neutral because the Solidarity 
Centre is clearly pro-labour movement. Another weakness might be that Joel Beinin, again, is 
one of the main authors because I have used several sources written by him in this thesis. 
However he still is one of the most prominent historians within labour history of the Middle 
East.  
The	  Draft	  Law	  on	  Trade	  Unions	  
This source is a proposed amendment to the Labour Law of Egypt published by the Centre for 
Trade Unions and Workers Services in 2009. It is used as a source to the perspectives of the 
workers’ movement in Egypt. It raises the need for independent unions and attacks the state 
and the official trade union structure for being oppressive to workers. This document starts 
with a prelude explaining the situation for workers and that the need for independent unions is 
essential to building democracy in Egypt. Then the groups and people that created the Draft 
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Law are listed and thanked. After that there is a declaration of principles by the CTUWS 
before the actual proposed paragraphs of the draft law follows. At the end of the document all 
official information about the CTUWS can be found. What it is, where its offices are located 
and what campaigns it supported is just some of the information found here. It is one of the 
most important sources for chapter one of this thesis because it contains detailed information 
about the Centre for Trade Unions and Workers Services.  
 
Strengths of this source is that it gives good insight to the demands of the workers’ movement 
and gives an interesting perspective on the conflict between state and workers. It is also 
written by Egyptian workers themselves whilst American or European authors wrote most of 
my other sources. A weakness with the source is that it is quite polemical and does not 
provide a neutral point of view on the issues it describes. It slanders the official trade union 
structure for oppressing workers without considering the opposing point of view.     
The	  most	  important	  experts	  of	  the	  field	  
My main academic source for the topic of my thesis is writings and lectures by Joel Benin. He 
is the foremost academic expert on labour history in the Middle East. As a professor in history 
at Stanford University in California he has worked in the department of Social Studies at the 
American University in Cairo. For 10 years he lived in Egypt and did fieldwork on the 
workers’ movement. He has published several book and articles on this topic. In addition he 
has also been the mentor of many other expert of these issues like Dina Bishara and others 
that came out of the AUC. Beinin is a former leftist radical and used to be the editor of the 
academic magazine called the Middle East Report.  
 
Another important author that have given a theoretical background for this thesis is the late 
Samer Soliman. He was a professor in political science and political economy at the AUC. In 
his book The Autumn of Dictatorship he provides theoretical language for writing about 
political issues. He explains how to use Marxist analysis and Rational Choice theory in an 
Egyptian context. I had the pleasure of meeting him before he died only 44 years old. Soliman 
was a socialist democrat and started a political party after revolution. He was also a human 
rights activist and co-founded the organisation Egyptians Against Discrimination.  
Source	  critique	  and	  Perspectives	  	  	  
In the thesis I will show the different perspectives on the events in the history of the labour 
movement. The most important perspective, in my opinion, is the one coming from the 
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movement itself. Therefore I have chosen the CTUWS as the main focus of my paper. They 
have worked as labour activists for decades and know the issues of workers in Egypt. Besides 
this, their activities have been documented by activists, newspapers and in archives. How 
close has the relationship with the grass root at the workplaces really been? This is an 
important discussion that has no definite answers. Because some of the critique the 
organisation has received is that they are detached from the grass root and they only want to 
work politically and engage in dialog with the elite. According their critics they have stopped 
being protestors with the focus of activism and turned into politicians. On the other hand the 
CTUWS defend themselves by saying that they are both an organisation for the grass root, but 
also a political pressure group and legal advice organisation. There are several interesting 
discussions like this within the workers’ movement about the role of the CTUWS and I will 
present more of them in chapter 2 of this thesis.  
 
The method of source critique I want to use is to put quotes and perspective up against each 
other to show how complex this issue has been in Egypt. For example, some of my sources 
describe the workers’ movements as hooligans and troublemakers. The unions, whether under 
the ETUF or in the independent movement, are accused of being corrupt and engaged in 
organized crime according the their adversaries. Other sources describe the workers’ 
movement as the real heroes of the revolution and romanticize them. I do not want to prove 
either view right or wrong, but only present their perspectives in a critical light. My source 
critique will not be contained to one chapter, but I will use it throughout my thesis.  
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Chapter	  1:	  History	  of	  the	  Workers’	  Movement	  in	  
Modern	  Egypt	  	  
Before	  1882	  
Workers	  in	  the	  late	  Ottoman	  Empire	  
Before the industrial revolution reached the Middle East, Egypt was one of the breadbaskets 
of the Ottoman Empire. Most of the people were farmers and made up the most productive 
parts of a semi-feudal economic system. The peasants were oppressed in Egypt until the mid 
twentieth century and thus the opposition towards the Mehmet Ali Pasha dynasty and its 
economic strategy was greater in rural areas than in urban centres. The fiercest resistance was 
located in Upper Egypt, where there were at least five peasant uprisings in the 1820s.41  
 
In 1881 peasants became important supporters of the Urabi revolt and it was only after the 
British Army intervened that the regime managed to regain control.42 Great Britain would 
keep its power in Egypt until 1954. The Sultan or his Viceroy owned most of the land in 
Egypt and a network of noblemen and army commanders managed this. They practiced a 
sharecropping system of harvesting were the ruler would lease a piece of land to a tenant 
farmer.43 The tenant farmer would live and farm the land. The formalities concerning rent and 
payment would differ from place to place and depending on what time in history one looks at, 
but normally a prearranged amount of money and a most of the crops would be paid as rent to 
the landowner. In turn the tenant would be allowed to keep some of the surplus. 
 
In the late Ottoman Empire a professional class of decommissioned soldiers would take the 
role as landowners on behalf of the viceroy and they would subjugate the peasants and the 
sharecroppers who were dependent on credit from merchants. The merchants and the 
landowners would often collaborate to extort as much capital from the farmers as possible and 
it was a deliberate strategy to indebt them. It is no wonder that the most militant challenge to 
authority in Egypt in late Ottoman times was peasant riots. Theses riots were often well 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Beinin Joel. Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East. Cambridge 2001 P. 26. 
42 Hourani Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. London 1991. P. 283. 
43 Beinin Joel. Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East. P. 24-25.  
	   36	  
organised and it would take a lot of military resources to quell them. They may be seen as the 
predecessor of the workers rebellions that Egypt would experience in the industrial age.  
 
In addition to the economic extortion the peasants were also used in corvée labour to build 
and maintain the canals of the Nile and large national enterprises like building the Suez Canal 
opened in 1869. Corvée labour is when the state forces a certain class of the population to 
work on public or private enterprises for no money. It differs from slavery in that it usually 
only lasts for as long as the project takes to be completed. It is estimated that 100 000 
Egyptians died digging the canal.44 The sharecropping system continued well into the 20th 
century. It was only after the land reforms in 1952 that most of the tenant farmers were 
offered to buy the piece of land they lived on.  
1882-­‐1952	   
The	  emergence	  of	  a	  workers’	  movement	  under	  colonial	  rule	  
The modern workers’ movement in Egypt started at the turn of the last century. Greek 
cigarette rollers in Cairo organised the first strike and later formed the first modern union 
between December 1899 and February 1900. This was in order to prevent the factory owners 
form hiring cheap unskilled labour to cut production cost.45  
 
The best-organised group of workers at the beginning of the twentieth century was railway 
and tramway employees. Their struggle was closely linked to the nationalist movement, and 
also against exploitation and abuse by foreign foremen. The people operating the Heliopolis 
tramway line in Cairo from 1910 were among this group of organised workers46.  
 
The National Party and its leader Muhammad Farid, who was heavily influenced by British 
and Scottish socialist movements, became an important voice for the conditions of workers in 
Egypt.47 In 1909 he was one of the first who publicly criticised the lack of labour laws and the 
bad conditions at many work places.48 The National Party also supported the first organisation 
that tried to unionise all workers. This group was called the Manual Trades Workers Union.     
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The growing workers’ movement was an important force in the years leading up to the 1919 
revolution and formal independence. The government, supported by the British army, 
attacked and tried to stifle the national movement, and forced its leader Saad Zaghloul into 
exile at Malta. This caused massive strikes and demonstrations between August and 
December in 1919.49 In the following year there were 84 major strikes and by 1921 around 90 
new unions were established throughout Egypt. Their membership numbers may have reached 
somewhere around 20 000 workers.50 
 
After the revolution in 1918 Egypt gained independence, but was still under military 
occupation and the economy remained under British control. However the revolution had 
sparked a nationalist wave that demanded full economic independence. To combat foreign 
economic domination the nationalist and capitalist Talat Pasha Harb founded Banque Misr 
(Bank of Egypt) in 1920 and went on to create a number of Egyptian businesses. He founded 
the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in 1923, and the factory at Ghazl al Mahalla was at 
that time the largest factory in the whole of Egypt. This was a major event for the 
industrialisation and the emerging of an industrial working class in Egypt. Other new 
enterprises such as a national railway line and an electricity company also created the need for 
skilled workers.  
 
Tens of thousands of workers were employed at Ghazl al Mahalla and conditions were hard. 
This led to the development of a workers’ movement that has served as an example to the 
entire Middle East. Throughout modern Egyptian history the strikes at this factory have been 
some of the most effective and successful acts of defiance against the different regimes until 
today. Ghazl al Mahalla would become one of the places where the CTUWS started their 
grass root work in their fight for workers rights. Most of the industry in Egypt was established 
in the 1920s and 30s under British occupation.  
 
In the 1920s and 1930s the various governments, usually under the Wafd Party umbrella, tried 
to undermine or control the workers’ movement. This practice was motivated by a belief that 
the ordinary workers and farmers of Egypt needed clever, educated and wealthy people to 
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fend for their rights.51 As a result the unions created under the patronage of the Wafd 
Government would collapse when rival parties came into power. This happened in 1925 when 
King Fuad I forced the government elected in 1924 to resign. The General Federation of 
Labour Unions in the Nile Valley, which was associated with the Wafd Party, became illegal. 
This federation represented around 150 000 workers and farmers.  
 
Between 1930 and 1933 there was an autocratic anti-union government in power. Prime 
Minister Ismail Sidqi who was nicknamed “the Butcher of the People”52 was in charge. Sidqi 
held the view that labour issues were a police matter and not a social matter.53 Therefore the 
government and the police tried to control and oppress the emerging working class and 
prevent them from organising.  
 
The League of Nations reacted to this situation by sending the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) on a fact-finding mission to Egypt. The commission emphasised the need 
for the foundation of independent labour unions. In 1932 the ILO accepted a legislation draft 
by the Egyptian government for basic protection of women and children in employment. The 
ILO accepted that the government claimed the country was too underdeveloped to implement 
anything more that minimal workers’ rights for women and children. However, the 
government gave in to the ILO demand to implement accident compensation at the 
workplace.54  
 
Law no. 48 of 1933 offered minimal protection but was an important piece of legislation 
because it introduced fixed working hours and the prohibition of child labour under the age of 
12.  The working day was set to maximum nine hours for women and in 1935 the law was 
extended to also include men. Children between 12 and 16 years old could work for up to 
eight hours a day. In addition to the labour laws being weak and poorly enforced, there were 
many loopholes in the legislation that helped employers to exploit workers. The government 
body for the enforcement of this law counted only six people in the whole country and the 
agents were unable to have great impact. 55 
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In May 1937 the Wafd government signed the Anglo-Egyptian treaty that would give the 
country more independence. 56  Despite having promised more workers’ rights while 
negotiating with the British, the government refused to pass legislation recognising the 
formation of trade unions. In the same year Egypt became a member of the International 
Labour Organisation. As a reaction to the anti-union policy of the government some veteran 
unionists started to reorganise and advocated independent unions.57 
 
In 1938 the Wafd government was ousted and in this political vacuum the General Federation 
of Labour Unions in the Kingdom of Egypt (GFLUKE) was established.58 The GFLUKE had 
no ties to the Wafd party nor any other political party. This was a major event in the history of 
the workers’ movement and of great significance in establishing the role of the working class 
in the growing industrial sector when dealing with political and social issues in Egypt.   
 
In 1939 the Egyptian parliament drafted a law to allow the formation of professional unions 
like the Doctors Syndicate or the Engineer Syndicate. The proposed law excluded women on 
religious grounds and it also prohibited the formation of trade unions. The difference between 
professional unions, or syndicates, and trade unions is that trade unions are for ordinary 
workers, and therefore the lower segments of the social classes. The draft law supported the 
higher social classes in strengthening their occupational positions, but intended to keep 
ordinary workers in unorganised and vulnerable working conditions. When members of the 
GFLUKE became concerned that this proposed law would be approved they organised a 
hunger strike on June the 12th 1939. After three days of massive pressure from the public the 
parliament gave in and had to start considering legalising trade unions.59 
 
This was an important victory for the workers’ movement, but the outbreak of World War 2 
did put the struggle for workers’ rights on hold. In 1940 martial law was declared in Egypt 
and this gave the authorities an opportunity to have the GFLUKE dissolved.60 In 1942 a 
government led by the Wafd party passed a law that addressed workers’ rights. Law no. 85 
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allowed the formation of trade unions. After this law was passed the independent labour 
movements became an important political and social factor. The workers’ movement grew 
rapidly and in 1944 there were 350 new unions with around 120 000 members.61  
 
The industrial working class in the cities grew during the war.  This was due to exports to the 
war effort on the front lines. In 1945 there was 623 000 workers in over 130 000 factories. 
The agenda for the workers’ movement in the years following the war was fighting 
unemployment and demanding better wages. There were several waves of nationalist and 
popular protests in the late 1940s and the workers’ movement played an important role in 
organisingdemonstrations and strikes to undermine the British military rule and the 
increasingly unpopular government of king Farouk I.62 
 
The different unions tried to consolidate and form a federation of unions in 1946, but this 
attempt was unsuccessful because of conflicting internal ideologies. However, the main 
reason was that Ismail Sidqi returned to the prime ministers office and closed the workers’ 
Marxist newspapers and threw the labour union leaders in prison.63 As a reaction to the 
crackdown by the government a strike was organized in 1947 at the Misr Spinning and 
Weaving factory in Mahalla al Kubra. The three reasons to go on strike were to prevent mass 
lay offs, anger towards the management for forming a pro-company union and harsh 
mistreatment from the foremen. The “yellow” pro-company union tried to discredit the strike 
by claiming that Jewish communists were behind the workers’ action. The strike took place 
between September and October and only ended when the police carried out a raid on the 
factory and arrested around 300 strikers.64 After that the “yellow” union held a general 
assembly in order to legitimate their activities as a proper workers’ union. As most of the 
strike activists were imprisoned, the “yellow” union only accepted company-endorsed 
nomination and the remaining work force was intimated by recent events, the “yellow” union 
was able to win all candidacies and thereby formalised their control.  
 
To prevent future actions and strikes the government reformed the labour law in 1948 and 
introduced national production standards, minimum wages, eight-hour days and a six-day 
week. This seemed good, but in fact the minimum wage was set so low that it was impossible 
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to live on. The introduction of minimum wages thus allowed employers to pay workers less 
than they had before and in some instances the wages were reduced with as much as down 
50%.65  
 
In 1951 the government cancelled the Anglo-Egyptian treaty ratified in 1936. This was the 
first step towards the ending of British occupation, and coincided with a surge in nationalist 
and workers’ activities. This led to a coalition of several political forces like nationalists, 
communists and independent trade union leaders establishing a preparatory committee to 
form the General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions.66 The founding congress was to be 
held in January 1952. The congress was never held because on the 26th of January central 
Cairo was engulfed in a fire and the residential area called Garden City was burned to the 
ground. In the chaos that ensued martial law was declared, the trade union congress was 
banned and many activists were arrested as a means to ensuring the government and the army 
remaining in control. The fire in Cairo marked the symbolic end of the monarchy and the 
dynasty of Mehmet Ali Pasha that lasted from 1805 to 1952.     
	  
1952-­‐1970	  	  
Gamal	  Abdel	  Nasser	  and	  the	  silencing	  of	  the	  Workers’	  movement	  
On the 23rd of July 1952 the Free Officers led by Muhammed Naguib and Gamal Abdel 
Nasser staged a coup d’état overthrowing the infant King Fuad II and the Wafd government. 
The Free Officers established the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) that acted as a 
provisional government. Most workers supported the RCC because they offered complete 
independence, social justice and the end of feudalism in rural areas.67  
 
 
After these incidents the RCC met some of the workers demands by reforming the labour 
laws. They made it more difficult for employers to lay off worker and improved work benefits 
such as bonuses. On the other hand the law reform prohibited strikes and made arbitration by 
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the government compulsory in wage conflicts. Most workers held the view that the reform 
brought more positive than negative change and tried to cooperate with the new regime.  
 
In 1956 Gamal Abdel Nasser won the presidential election as the only candidate with 99.9% 
of the votes. Egypt became a republic by law and a state run by the military in practice. Abdel 
Nasser achieved great popularity in Egypt and the Arab world. On the 23rd of July 1956 Egypt 
nationalised the Suez Canal. Great Britain, France and Israel declared war on Egypt in an 
attempt remove Abdel Nasser form power. In the midst of the war in 1956 the International 
Confederation of Arab Trade Unions was established with its main office in Cairo. They 
called for a blockade of oil shipments passing through the Suez Canal going to France and 
Great Britain and for solidarity with the Egyptian workers’ movement. The incident became 
an embarrassment to the regime of Abdel Nasser because it wanted to create the image of 
Egypt as a workers paradise. This was a stark contrast to the reality where workers had few 
rights and no independent unions.68 As a result the government was forced to formally 
recognize the Egyptian Workers Federation (EWF) established on the 30th of January 1957. 
Egypt was defeated military in the war but managed to keep the Suez Canal with the support 
of the Soviet Union and the United States. Israel was forced to evacuate the territory they had 
occupied.69  
 
The government made sure it had full control of the EWF union form the beginning. The 
government appointed the executive board, there were no nominations from among the 
workers and no elections during the founding assembly. The EWF changed its name into the 
Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) in 1961, but the organisation remained the same 
and the links to the government became stronger.70 From 1962 to 1986 the chairman of the 
ETUF also held the position as Minister of Labour. The ETUF was the only legal trade union 
in Egypt until the revolution in 2011 and all new unions had to be recognized and formally 
connected to ETUF.  
 
During the late 1950s and 1960s Abdel Nasser was able to consolidate his economic reform 
policy into a system called Arab Socialism. The system was based on the authority of the 
military, populist rhetoric by the president and import-substitution industrialisation. It was an 
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economic policy aimed at achieving self-sufficiency by replacing imported goods with 
domestic production.71 All enterprises owned by foreigners were nationalised and the workers 
in these enterprises became state-employees. The standard of living for workers improved 
under Arab Socialism. The wages improved, state-provided housing was better and social 
welfare programs like retirement pensions were introduced.    
 
The main goal of the Free Officers was to establish control as effectively as possible. They 
did not tolerate an active and independent workers’ movement. Just one month before the 
coup d’etat the workers at Mahalla al Kubra had initiated a strike on the 12th of June 1952 
where they demanded an independent union, reasonable working hours and wages. The next 
day the army intervened and 11 workers were put before a military tribunal. Mustafa Khamis 
and Muhammed al Badri were convicted and executed on the 7th September 1952.72 Another 
major strike was initiated in the industrial town of Kafr al Dawwar south of Alexandria on the 
21st of August 1952. The army cracked down on the workers and thus were able to put an end 
to the strike.73 
 
Even if the conditions got better for workers during the age of Arab Socialism there was no 
opportunity to organise freely. The regime did not want workers to unionise independently. 
The state would be like a great father figure that could not be questioned. Unions were meant 
to be a mechanism to increase production, not as organisations that made demands on 
employers. The government certainly did not accept any kinds of strikes or demonstrations.74 
All political opposition was met with physical force like mass arrests and even executions. 
The government successfully gained control over the trade unions, but since the economic 
policy of the regime provided better living conditions for many workers they accepted the 
limitations on their rights and freedoms.  
 
The benefits for state-employees included free health care, access to cooperatives that sold 
subsidised food, state sponsored housing and a good pension. In addition workers in state run 
enterprises had the right to elect representatives to the board of managers and received cash 
bonus of 3% of the profits each year. Incomes in the public sector increased by the double 
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between 1960 and 1964. All high school and university graduates were guaranteed a job in the 
public sector and firing a worker became almost impossible.75 
 
For a while the reforms of Abdel Nasser worked a bit like the New Deal had in the USA in 
the 1930s. For a time it seemed that Arab Socialism was a success and it did lift the nation in 
the fields of education, economy and working conditions. The first five-year plan of Abdel 
Nasser between 1957 and 1962 created 1 million new jobs and an annual GDP growth on 6%. 
It provided enough growth to stifle the growth of a more militant workers’ movement and 
opposition in general. Most people benefited from the reforms and therefore they believed in 
Abdel Nasser. The next five-year plan, from 1962-1967, did not fare so well. The attempts to 
expand domestic consumption and production failed and the five-year plan was abandoned 
due to lack of capital investment. Wages began to fall and the number of work hours per 
person started to increase by 1965.76  
 
After the 1967 war with Israel opposition against the regime arose because of the humiliating 
defeat, the loss of the Sinai Peninsula and the failure to liberate Palestine. Egyptian losses are 
estimated to around 15 000 dead, 23 000 wounded and 10 000 missing.77 Abdel Nasser 
resigned on the 7th June 1967 because of losing of the war, but was asked to come back 
popular consensus the next day. However he had lost the saintly image as the saviour of the 
Arab peoples.78  In both 1967 and 1968 students, workers and other state employees protested 
and called a general strike. Several times during these two years the army opened fire on 
protesters and due to the brutality of the repression the revolt failed. This was the start of mass 
mobilisation in Egypt, and Ghazl al Mahalla was a focal point.  
 
On the 28th of September 1970 Gamal Abdel Nasser died and the Arab world lost its greatest 
hero and symbol. Despite of his mistakes he was loved by most Egyptians to the last. Around 
six million people took to the street of Cairo for his funeral.79 The next leader, Anwar al 
Sadat, would face a much more determined and capable opposition than his predecessor. 
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1967-­‐1968	  revolts	  
A major event in the history of the workers’ movement in the era of Abdel Nasser was a 
series of demonstrations, started on the 10th of June 1967, against the government’s decision 
to capitulate and surrender to the Israelis. The demonstrators wanted to escalate the conflict 
and wage a “people’s war” against the enemy.80 They envisaged swarming all the way to Tel 
Aviv and throwing the Zionists into the sea. The workers’ movement joined these 
demonstrations early on. After a couple of days the Abdel Nasser was able to calm down the 
masses. The streets were relatively calm until February 1968 and then the anger of the masses 
became evident. Students, workers and civil servant marched against the humiliation of the 
government of the behalf of the Egyptian people and strikes were organised. The minister of 
the interior met the demonstrators and said he understood the frustration of the youth, but 
never the less he banned any further demonstrations. This only provoked the masses and the 
police had to protect the minister. The demonstrations ended in street battles between the 
police and the crowds.  
 
The following day marches were organised along several routes through Cairo to the Peoples’ 
Assembly where demonstrators chanted slogans like “The Police is the enemy of the people” 
and “Dismiss the congress of incompetence”. After a while a small delegation of students 
where sent inside to convey the demands of the people: To punish the cowardly generals who 
made the Egypt loose the war, freedom of the press and information in general about the war 
effort and the aftermath, free elections independent of the Arab Socialist Union, the 
establishment of independent student unions and the withdrawal of the police and the security 
forces who had besieged the campus of the University of Cairo.81      
 
The situation escalated in the following days and the police were unable to hinder the 
organising of new demonstrators. A large demonstration was held at Tahrir Square and all 
segments of the population joined in. After this the army was called in and dispersed the 
demonstrators with tear gas and live ammunition. At the University of Cairo the 
demonstrations continued aided by high school students aged between fifteen and seventeen 
years old, but the army later managed to stop these demonstrations.  
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On the 20th of November the same year the growing opposition among the masses was 
mobilised once more and this time the different groups of protesters were coordinated better. 
The demonstrations evolved into a general revolt and the police and army were unable to stop 
it. The people’s anger was now more directly aimed at the police, the oppressing state 
apparatus, and demands were formed on a more ideological basis. The slogans “Freedom” 
and “Down with dictatorship” were chanted by the masses. All classes were engaged in 
numerous demonstration not only in Cairo, but also in the Mansoura and Alexandria.   
 
The army intervened again and this time they used helicopter and machine guns on the 
crowds, but even when thousands were killed the rebellion only escalated. After three days of 
street battles the revolt exhausted itself. It was the protestors’ lack of political leadership and 
unity that prevented this riot form becoming a fully-fledged revolution. The repression by the 
state became even more severe when Egypt entered the War of Attrition with Israel.82  
	  
1970-­‐1981	  	  
Anwar	  al	  Sadat	  and	  the	  Open	  Door	  Policy	  	  
Anwar al Sadat was the president of Egypt between 1970 and 1981. The most important 
events in his reign were the shift from a plan economy inspired by socialism to a neoliberal 
free market economy and the 1973 October War with Israel. In this war Egypt retook parts of 
the Sinai Peninsula that had been occupied by Israelis since 1967. However, it was not until 
1982 that the whole of Sinai was evacuated by Israeli troops. Egypt considered this war a 
great victory and an act of revenge after the humiliating defeat in 1967 and this strengthened 
and secured the presidency of al Sadat.83  
 
After the war al Sadat became a national hero and he felt strong enough to reform the 
constitution and implement his new Open Door policy. 84  This means Al Infitah in Arabic and 
the policy meant opening of Egypt to the world market. The Open Door policy in Egypt was a 
result of the Washington Consensus.85 An agreement promoted by the United States, the 
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World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to encourage neo-liberal economic 
policies in development countries. Despite the efforts of the regime to privatize it did not 
manage to downsize the public sector. Instead the public sector actually expanded during the 
years of al Sadat.86 
 
From 1974 to 1982 there was a global oil boom and this caused a flow of Egyptian workers to 
the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia.87 Poor peasants and workers could earn many times their 
annual income in the oil producing Gulf States than they could at home. Money transfers form 
these migrant workers became a large largest input of hard currency in Egypt in this period as 
well as an important factor to social mobility.88   
 
The IMF conducted a survey mission to Egypt in 1976 and in agreement with them the state 
decided to withdraw its subsidies on basic food commodities. This meant starvation for 
millions of Egyptians who depended on these subsidies.89 What has become known as the 
1977 Bread Riots was a direct result of this subsidy withdrawal.  
 
After this crisis al Sadat became even more repressive than Abdel Nasser had been. The 
regime closed the newly opened newspapers and quelled all dissent by brutal means. When he 
entered into peace talks with Israel and later signed an agreement, some Islamists within the 
army started to plot his assassination.  
 
The reign of Anwar Sadat came to an abrupt end on the 6th of October 1981 when he was 
assassinated at the annual celebration of the October War in 1973. The assassination squad 
that shot the president was a group of army officers that opposed the peace agreement with 
Israel that had been signed at Camp David in 1978. The leader of this group Khalid 
Islambouli was tried by military tribunal and executed in 1982.90 The martial law that had 
been implemented in the 1967 war was lifted for 18 months during 1980 and 1981. The 
martial law has been in effect.  
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1977	  Bread	  riots	  
Between the 18th and 19th of January 1977 there were uprisings in most of the major cities in 
Egypt. The cause of the riots was that the government had cut the subsidies on basic food 
commodities. It started with organised demonstrations but before long escalated into riots 
with masses of people thrashing property, burnings shops and raising havoc. The streets of 
Cairo and other cities erupted in violent riots as workers, farmers, students and masses of poor 
people attacked anything they associated with the new economic policy. They burned the 
luxury hotels and casinos on Pyramid Road highway located between Cairo and the 
Pyramids.91  Even the revolutionary members of the Egyptian Communist Party were shocked 
by the violence by the enraged masses. These were not disciplined revolutionaries, but an 
unleashed mass of hungry and desperate people. Without the food subsidies the poor lost their 
main means of survival and had no choice but to fight back. They attacked the homes of 
celebrities and the nouveau riches that had profited on the Open Door policy.  
 
During these riots the workers at some of the most important factories in Egypt went out on 
strike. Workers from Gahzl al Mahalla, Hilwan Steel Mill and several other factories laid 
down their work with the demands that the government reintroduced the subsides they had 
removed.92 The violence continued to spread and on the second day the army intervened and 
crushed the strikes and demonstrations nationwide. The government had to back down and 
continue with the food subsides and in this way the masses and the strikers won an important 
victory. The Bread Riots in 1977 has since been recognised as a prime example on what 
happens when the different oppositional forces join with the poor masses in revolt. According 
to Abdallah al Senawy, when the masses arise the ones in power have to listen.93       
	  
1981-­‐2011	  	  
The	  Mubarak	  era	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  independent	  workers’	  movement	  
Hosni Mubarak was the Vice-President of Anwar al Sadat and took over on the 14th of 
October 1981. He served as President for 30 years before he was toppled during the 
revolution on the 11th of February 2011. He continued and intensified the economic policies 
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of his predecessor. After 1982 the oil prices started to fall and this led to an economic 
recession in Egypt and prompted the government to implement more neo-liberal reforms to 
reduce the deficit in the state budget.94 Between 1984-1989 the government continued the 
neo-liberal economic reforms according to the Washington Consensus in spite of more 
expensive consumer goods, lower real wages, and a dramatic increase in collective workers’ 
protests.  
 
As an example the government doubled the mandatory wage deductions for their health and 
pension plans in the public sector. As a reaction to this the textile workers in the town of Kafr 
El Dawwar went on strike in October 1984.95 The strike escalated to a street riot that lasted 
for three days. The strikers cut telephone lines, lighted fires, stopped traffic and wrecked 
trains before they were met with violent military repression.  
 
In 1984 and in 1986 there were mass strikes against the impact of the neo-liberal policy of the 
government. The workers in public enterprises reacted to the privatisation policy of the 
government and they wanted to keep the gains introduced in the days of Abdel Nasser. A 
reasonable wage, a pension package, health insurance and a workers’ representative in the 
governing boards of the enterprises.96 The strikes were well organised and other means of 
civil unrest were added to increase the impact of the strikes. Sabotage of infrastructure like in 
Kafr el Dawwar was part of this civil unrest. The 1988 strike in Mahalla al Kubra will be 
described in detail in a part of its own since it is of major importance for the development of 
the CTUWS.  
 
Similar events took place at the Iron and Steel Company in the Helwan south of Cairo. The 
local branch of the state run union ETUF refused to support the workers’ demands for better 
pay. The elected workers’ representatives that complained to the board of the company were 
sacked and this provoked strikes both in July and August 1989. One worker was killed and 
hundreds were injured when the security forces dispersed the August strike.97 This is the 
strike in where Kamal Abbas was arrested, put in cross-reference.98  
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The 1980s a strike movement started to challenge the control of the ETUF. Dissident 
workers’ newspapers started to publish critical articles about the government’s economic 
policy and the close ties between the state apparatus and the only legal trade union. Some 
NGOs that brought workers’ issues to the attention of the public were formed in this period. 
Most of these publications and NGOs were shut down in the 1990s when the new regime of 
Mubarak tightened his control of the media and the workers’ movement.99  
 
At the end of 1980s Egypt was on the brink of bankruptcy and it was only their involvement 
in the first Iraqi war in 1991 on the side of the USA that saved the economy. The Americans, 
who were Egypt’s main creditor, cancelled most of the foreign debt and thus both the 
economy and the regime of Mubarak were saved for the time being. 100  
 
In 1991 Mubarak endorsed the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program 
(ERSAP) through Law 203 of 1991.101 This reform program was an agreement between the 
World Bank, the IMF and Egypt. Law 203 of 1991 listed 314 public sector enterprises that 
should be turned into private enterprises. The ETUF had tried to resist the privatisation 
measures of the government since the Open Door policy in the 1970s, but Law 203 was the 
final blow to this effort, when its chairman Sayyid Rashid approved this legislation in 1991.102  
 
Law 203 did not permit the mass layoffs of workers, but often public sector managers were 
allowed to cut down on staff before the enterprises were sold to private actors.103 This was 
meant to increase efficiency, but in reality it was a loophole that helped to sack thousands of 
workers. In addition to this many newly privatized companies simply broke the law and laid 
people off anyway as the authorities turned a blind eye.   
 
In July 2004 Hosni Mubarak appointed Ahmed Nazif to Prime Minister. His job was to 
accelerate the privatisation policy according to the Economic Reform and Structural 
Adjustment Program. During his first year in office he ordered the privatisation of 17 public 
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enterprises. The government´s policy was seen as closely associated with the businessmen in 
the circle around the president´s son Gamal Mubarak.  
 
The minimum wage in Egypt was 35 Egyptian pounds (E£) a month in 1984 and this was 
adjusted in 2008 to 110 E£.  The basic wage in the public textile industry was 250 E£ and this 
was only changed after the protest wave in 2004 and then only to 450 E£. These low wages 
did not cover the increased cost of living and the rate of inflation that has taken place since 
the 1980s.104  
 
In the 1990s the conditions for the workers worsened and unemployment rose. Therefore the 
workers’ movement initiated strikes and protests. The dissent toward the ETUF grew and it 
was seen more and more as a loyal servant of the regime.  Unemployment rose from 8 % in 
1998 to 12 % in 2002-03 and the anxiety of the workers started to become a serious challenge 
to the government.105 In the 2000s the workers’ movement became a major contributor to the 
largest social mobilisation for half a decade.   
 
As a reaction to escalated strike activities and more critical media coverage the government 
started to tighten the control and started to crack down on dissent. During his first decade in 
power Mubarak tried to gain support by lifting some of the most authoritative measures that 
Sadat had imposed after the Bread Riots in 1977. One example of this is that the small but 
radical leftist party called the Tagammu was tolerated as long as it did not criticise the 
government directly. But whenever the party talked about the shortcomings of the president it 
would be met with brutal police repression. This example shows that minor opposition was 
tolerated for short periods, but was always kept at a manageable level by the regime. In 
addition, oppositional candidates from the Muslim Brotherhood were tolerated for a period 
and they gained some prominence before met state repression again.106 In the early 1990s the 
invasion of Iraq and the government’s economic policy led to increased criticism by the 
population. According to the BBC Hosni Mubarak survived six different assassination 
attempts.107  
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These attempts caused the return to the hard-handed policy of Abdel Nasser and al Sadat. The 
repression was so hard that in the 1990s that even the worker’ movement was afraid to 
organise protests against the regime. There was a very real risk to getting killed if joining an 
anti-government protest. The conditions for workers got worse when Egypt accepted a 
directive from the IMF to intensify their privatisation program in 1993. In the 1990s the 
crackdowns became more severe and the workers’ movement experienced a low period of 
fewer strikes and less opportunities to organise.108   
1988	  Anti-­‐Mubarak	  demonstration	  
Workers at Ghazi al Mahalla have always had a deep sense of loyalty to the factory and 
solidarity towards their fellow workers.109 One indication of this solidarity was that the 
workers created an educational fund to send their children to school. The management agreed 
to contribute to this fund together with the workers. In 1988 the government of Hosni 
Mubarak ordered the factory management to make cutbacks so the company could increase 
profit. One of the budget posts that were cut was the children’s educational fund. The whole 
fund was taken away, not only the portion of money contributed by the management, but also 
the money that the workers had put in was taken away.110 This was not only theft and an 
insult in the eyes of the workers, but also as a consequence of the neo-liberal austerity 
measures initiated by the government.  
 
Only hours after the cancellation of the education fund was made public, more than 20 000 
workers at Ghazl al Mahalla went on strike. They made a coffin with the picture of Mubarak’s 
face and for the first time the slogan “Iskut, Iskut Hosni Mubarak”111 were heard.  One worker 
that participated in this strike said that they made a word play over the Muslim creed, the 
Shahada.112 They changed “There is only one God, and Muhammad is his Prophet” to “There 
is only one God and, and Mubarak is his Enemy.113 Later the Muslim Brotherhood would 
adopt this slogan as their own, but Ibrahim Hamdi, a worker at Ghazl al Mahalla, insists that 
they were the first who used it.  
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The answer to this strike was brutal repression by the security forces. The repression was so 
severe that it almost crushed the workers movement ability to organise and be active. There 
was virtually no militant labour movement in Mahalla during the 1990s. The workers fell 
silent, because they were afraid to get killed, incarcerated or fired.114 The next wave of strikes 
and civil strife in Egypt would erupt in the early 2000s and lead to the toppling of the regime.     
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Part	  II:	  Comparison	  of	  four	  Egyptian	  Organizations	  
	  
Structure	  of	  part	  two	  
	  
This part of the thesis provides a more detailed presentation of the four organisations. They 
are the main subjects of my research. The most important organisation among the four is the 
Centre for Trade Unions and Workers Services because they are a central actor in the 
Egyptian workers’ movement. Therefore the part about them is quite substantially longer than 
the parts about the three other organisations. The chapter contains an account of the history of 
the CTUWS and the people that were important in the foundation of the organisation. There is 
less emphasis on the other three organisations because they are not a part of the workers’ 
movement. However, they are relevant as points of comparison because the services they 
provide are similar and they are all actors in civil society. 
 
The organisations were chosen during fieldwork in the preparation of this thesis. Initially they 
were chosen because they were the ones I gained access to, but later it became clear that there 
were significant similarities between them both politically and practically. When it came to 
political similarities all the organisations joined the opposition movement against the elected 
President Mohammed Morsi who held office between 30th of June 2012 and 3rd of July 2013. 
In practical terms the organisations engaged in much of the same types of services towards 
the people they were helping.    
 
The CTUWS is compared with the Association for the Protection of the Environment, the 
Democratic Front Party and the Salafiya Costa Movement in order to focus on the similarities, 
when it comes to their daily practices on the grass root level. The most important similarities 
in what the four organisations do are education, aid and services and their role as mediators.    
 
Part two of this thesis is structured with one chapter on each organisation. Here all the 
empirical data I have gathered is presented and discussed. Each organisation’s journey from 
underground movement to mass movement and back again is presented and discussed, as well 
as its role in Egyptian civil society.  
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Chapter	  2:	  The	  Centre	  for	  Trade	  Unions	  and	  
Workers	  Services	  (CTUWS)	  
The Centre for Trade Unions and Workers Services (CTUWS) was founded in 1990 and since 
then it has been in the midst of labour activism. The CTUWS has laid some of the foundation 
for the growth of an independent workers’ movement and civil society in Egypt. I define the 
independent workers’ movements as a group of workers that fight for the right to organize 
freely, outside the supervision of the ETUF. During the time of Mubarak the ETUF gradually 
lost all credibility as a trade union federation. The CTUWS has tried to change the system for 
the better by secretly training disciplined strike leaders in the factories they had access to and 
by supporting local workers’ campaigns for better wages and working conditions.115 The 
CTUWS has been active for 24 years and it has been able to survive as an organisation for so 
long by being dynamic and flexible. 
 
As the regime’s attitude towards labour rights worsened the CTUWS would change its tactics 
and methods to suit the situation. This meant that the organisation remained adaptable and 
eventually became a central point of opposition. At times the secret police would harass the 
activists and they would break into different CTUWS offices to smash them up. Both secret 
and uniformed police would regularly arrest and torture CTUWS members. When this failed 
to stop the organisation’s activities, members would be charged with for instance disturbing 
the peace and blasphemy.  
 
The history of the CTUWS is here divided into the three following stages: Early Years, The 
Mass-movement and Post-Revolution. In the early years the role of the founding key 
individuals was essential. During these years the practices of the CTUWS were formed and 
developed. The link between radical leftists and workers’ activists played a major role in 
creating the CTUWS and made them a part of the opposition against the neo-liberal economic 
strategies of the state. In the second stage the CTUWS became a more important voice in the 
workers’ movement and in the emergence of the mass-movement, culminating in the 2011 
revolution. The CTUWS was an important organisation in the mass-movement opposition that 
turned against the government and finally against Hosni Mubarak. In the third stage the 
CTUWS went through major changes in the post revolutionary situation that emerged after 
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the government of Mubarak were toppled. The revolution was a product of decades of 
struggle against oppression and deprivation. However, why the revolution happened when it 
did is a complex question, like this famous quote by Lenin suggests: “It is impossible to 
predict the time and progress of revolution. It is governed by its own more or less mysterious 
laws. But when it comes it moves irresistibly”.116     	  
The	  CTUWS	  founders	  	  
The labour activists Youssef Darwish and Kamal Abbas founded the Centre for Trade Unions 
and Workers Services in 1990. Darwish was born in 1910 in a Karaite Jewish117 community 
in Cairo. He went abroad to study and when he returned to Egypt from France in 1934 he 
marked himself as a lawyer specialising in labour law. In 1946 he co-founded the Workers 
Committee for National Liberation (WCNL), which became the first official Marxist 
organisation in Egypt. Later the WCNL would become instrumental in creating the Workers 
and Peasants Communist Party (WPCP) and the Communist Party of Egypt (CPE). Veteran 
communist activists, like Darwish, who were active from the 1940s onwards, became 
important inspirations to new generation of activists in the workers’ movement in later 
decades. The foundation of the CTUWS was a result of accumulated activist experience over 
several decades.      
 
After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 Darwish converted to Islam in protest. In 
1958 he was arrested during Abdel Nasser’s repression on communists and spent six years in 
prison. During the following regimes of Anwar al Sadat and Hosni Mubarak Darwish was 
arrested several times and subjected to torture. As recalled in his own words: “I was arrested 
so many times that when anybody tapped me on the shoulder I expected a state security agent 
had come to arrest me".118  
 
After being imprisoned once again in 1973, he escaped from first to Algeria and later to 
Czechoslovakia. In 1986 he came back to Egypt and continued to give legal advice to the 
workers’ movement. At this time he was 80 years old, but he would still represent workers for 
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free in court.119 The CTUWS was officially founded in 1990, but by then workers had already 
started organising and had acquired experience from the steel factories in Hilwan. Hilwan is 
one of the most important industrial areas in Egypt. Youssef Darwish died at the age of in 
Cairo in 2006.  
 
All the biographical material about Darwish comes from a profile interview in al Ahram 
Weekly. This is an Egyptian weekly newspaper in English published both in print and online. 
Al Ahram was a state owned newspaper until the revolution in 2011 and it was subjected to 
censorship from the state and the military. However, the English language al Ahram Weekly 
had more autonomy than the Arabic paper. The journalist Fayza Rady has covered worker 
related issues in al Ahram Weekly since the 1990s.  
 
Kamal Abbas was the second founding member of the CTUWS. He was born in 1955 and at 
the age of 20 he became a welder at the Hilwan Iron and Steel Mill. In 1989 he became 
involved in labour activism by participating in a strike for a wage increase and a free meal 
during the workday.120 Over 19 000 workers joined the strike and the security forces resorted 
to violence in order to end the strike. Kamal Abbas was one of the strike leaders that was 
arrested and tortured by the police. 
 
Torture in police custody is widespread in Egypt and it was one of the main grievances for the 
revolutionaries in 2011. Before the revolution video clips recorded on mobile phones were 
leaked from several prisons. These clips showed police offices torturing ordinary prisoners 
with beatings, electroshocks and verbal abuse.121 Several of the activists in this thesis have 
been arrested and report being tortured in similar ways.   
 
When Abbas was released from prison he was fired by the management for his participation 
in the illegal strike. After that he decided to join Youssef Darwish in starting up the CTUWS 
to fight for workers’ legal rights. In the early years he saw himself as a progressive 
communist, inspired by Youssef Darwish and particularly the Solidarity Workers Movement 
in Poland during the 1980s. Solidarity started out as a strike movement and later became the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Profile interview by Faiza Rady with Youssef Darwish in the Internet version of Al Ahram Weekly. 
Published: 2-8 December 2004, Issue no. 719. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/719/profile.htm  
120 Se Chapter 1  
121 Bbc: Report on police brutality by jounalist Orla Guerin.. 04.12.13.  Shows video of prisoners being trotured 
by police. Similar footage exits form the before the revolution. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
25121936  
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main oppositional force to the pro-Soviet Polish government. Abbas later became more of a 
practical reformist and a spokesperson for the need of independent unions.122 He became 
involved in disputes with the official trade union structure or the ETUF over the issue of 
independent representation for workers in Hilwan. In the late 1990s and the early 2000s 
Abbas was involved in organising several strikes in Hilwan. 
 
In 2005 Abbas was attacked by plain-clothed security forces and severely beaten because of 
his outspoken critique of the ETUF and the government. The regime intensified its attempts to 
shut down the CTUWS and in April 2007 Abbas was sentenced to one year in prison for 
disturbing the peace and distorting the public image of Egypt. The police shut down the 
CTUWS branch offices the same year because of the escalating strike wave that was to a large 
extent coordinated from these.123 
 
The information about Kamal Abbas is from an interview on the webpage of the Israeli labour 
organisation the Workers Advice Centre. They express solidarity with the Egyptian workers 
despite deep-rooted distrust between the Egyptian and the Israeli populations. The interview 
shows something of Kamal Abbas’s personality and lets his voice be heard through frequent 
quotes. 
Underground	  actions	  in	  the	  early	  years	  
The local branches of the CTUWS and the activists have an almost iconic status within the 
workers’ movement in Egypt. This is because of their experience when it comes to organising 
opposition towards the state and their participation in strikes and demonstration. Their 
militancy in fighting for workers rights over several decades have made them heroes of the 
workers’ movement.    
 
The first decade after the founding of the CTUWS, there were few major clashes between the 
regime and the workers’ movement. It was only when they openly criticised the policy of the 
government they faced direct repression such as the 1986 and 1988 strikes. Both these actions 
started in the state owned textile factory Ghazl al Mahalla. Even if the official policy of the 
government was less repressive in the 1990s than it had been in previous decades a more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Interview with Kamal Abbas by the Workers Adivce Centre. Published on their website 14. March 2009. The 
Workers Advice Centre is an Israeli workers’ organisation. They are against discrimination of Arabs.  
http://www.wac-maan.org.il/en/article__53/egypts_workers_on_the_move  
123 Interview, conducted by the author, with Gamal abo el Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in 
Mahalla al Kubra. January 2014.  
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covert practice started to emerge. According to activists at CTUWS Mahalla the factories 
were being infiltrated by government spies after the 1988 strike.124 This was effective to the 
extent that many workers feared for their lives and refused to join any kind of strike 
movement or even contribute with their signature on petitions. The worker and activist 
Ibrahim Hamdi at Ghazl al Mahalla explains that: “In this time (1990s) ‘the security hand 
started to appear all over Egypt”.125 Despite the attempts to infiltrate the factories by the 
secret services, the CTUWS managed to continue its activism as well as the legal actions 
defending workers who had been fired illegally. Youssef Darwish was one of the pioneers in 
these legal processes.  
 
In addition to the legal proceedings, CTUWS activists at different local branches organised 
political underground activities. They had secret meetings with workers and arranged courses 
in political activism and passive resistance in Mahalla al Kubra, Hilwan and Suez. They 
managed to avoid being detected by government spies and this suggest that the workers 
usually had a good idea who was a spy and who was a regular worker. The secret meetings 
offered a welcome safe space for meeting other people, talking and sharing ideas in general. 
The fact that these secret meetings took place indicates that civil society did have some arenas 
where it could develop beyond the control of state surveillance.126  
 
The local branches CUTS usually functioned independently from the central office in Cairo. 
The workers in Mahalla al Kubra were known for their militancy before the CTUWS were 
founded in 1990. The anti-Mubarak strike in 1988 is an example of this.127 The workers at 
Gahzl al Mahalla call themselves the locomtive that pulls the workers’ movement train.128  
 
In 1991 the government of Egypt pledged itself to intensify the privatisation reforms 
recommended by the IMF and the World Bank through Law no. 203.129 As a response the 
CTUWS suggested that the state would take responsibility for ensuring safety of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Interview, conducted by the author, with Gama abo el Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in 
Mahalla al Kubra. January 2014.  
125 Interview, conducted by the author, with Gama abo el Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in 
Mahalla al Kubra. January 2014.  
126 Interview, conducted by the author, with Gama abo el Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in 
Mahalla al Kubra. January 2014. 
127 Se Chapter 1 
128 Interview, conducted by the author, with Gama abo el Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in 
Mahalla al Kubra. January 2014.  
129 See Chapter 1 
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workplaces and providing financial support and retraining to those who were laid off, instead 
of returning to state run enterprises.130 The new law included lists of public enterprises that 
had to be privatised, but it did not allow for large-scale cutbacks or mass lay offs. However 
the investors that took over the newly privatised companies often sacked workers when it 
suited them. The Labour Law in effect at this time was from 1975 and offered some 
protection for the workers in the public sector, but in the privatised enterprises these rights 
were disregarded in general and the government had no interest in enforcing this old law, 
because of its new official policy of speeding up the neo-liberal reforms.  
 
It was a normal strategy for managers to displace workers that were considered 
troublemakers. Problematic workers at a factory in Mahalla al Kubra would be sent to 
different branches of the company. This was the case with Hamdi Hossin. In 1988 he was one 
of ten strike-leaders who were first sent to prison and then, after his release the company sent 
him to a factory in Aswan to get rid of him.131 The strike was initiated because the 
government decided to cancel a schooling fund for the children of the workers at Ghazl al 
Mahalla. The strike ended when the government promised to reinstate the fund.132  
 
The Labour Law of 1975 defined the only legal trade unions in Egypt as the ones organised 
under the control of the state. The laws concerning formations of independent trade unions 
were restrictive and there was no way to organise legally without going through the structure 
of the ETUF.133 This policy started to become severely criticised by international and 
domestic and human and labour rights organisations. Therefore the CTUWS could not 
function publically as a trade union representing workers collectively, it could only help its 
members in individual civil law suits against the companies that laid them off. Any other 
actions, like organising strikes, distributing the workers’ newspaper called Workers Speech or 
providing courses in passive resistance to the factory workers were considered illegal. All 
these efforts by the CTUWS were conducted underground in secret, after work hours either in 
the CTUWS offices or in private homes.134 This is a further indication that Civil Society was 
growing, but underground.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Hill Enid. Discourses in Contemporary Egypt – Politics and Social Issues. Cairo 1999. P. 43.   
131 Revolution through Arab eyes – The Factory. Al Jazeera World Documnetary. Released 22.02.12.  
132 See Chapter 1  
133 The Draft Law on Trade Unions. Published by the CTUWS. 08.03.2009. P. 5.   
134 Interview with Gamal abo el Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in Mahalla al Kubra. 
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Mass-­‐Movement	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  2011	  Revolution	  	  
The role of the CTUWS and the rest of the workers’ movement changed dramatically in the 
2000s. In the 1990s there was only a small number of large strikes and most of the labour 
activism was underground, under the threat of violence from the secret services or 
clampdowns from the Security Forces. Labour activists lived with a great deal of insecurity 
and fear of being arrested. International and domestic events coincided to make room for a 
mass-movement, emerging from civil society, in opposition to the regime of Hosni Mubarak.  
 
After the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11th September 2001 Egypt became one of the fronts 
in the War on Terror. The government of Hosni Mubarak linked all sorts of opposition to 
religious extremism and international terrorism. This was an excuse to repress any group 
considered a threat. The Muslim Brotherhood was targeted and many of their members were 
imprisoned. The direct involvement of Egypt in the second Iraqi war in 2003 caused outrage 
in the streets. The Muslim Brotherhood used the war to recruit members at the universities 
that were against invasion. Many young people, who would never have thought of becoming a 
member of the Brotherhood, now joined the movement.135       
 
Another important event that led to a mass-movement against the government in Egypt was 
the transition of power from Hafiz al Assad to his son Bashar in 2000 in Syria. From 2005 
and onwards it seemed like the same would happen in Egypt. The President’s son Gamal 
Mubarak was given more and more power within the ruling National Democratic Party. 
Critical voices organised campaigns against the transition of power from father to son.136 The 
Syndicate of Journalists became one of the most outspoken groups against the regime.    
 
From this group of critics the group National Coalition for Change emerged, usually known 
as the Kefaya. They were most active between 2003 and 2005, and after the parliamentary 
elections in 2005 the Kefaya became less important. The Kefaya movement was criticised by 
both the radical left, the liberals and the Muslim groups for being too intellectual and not 
having a broad connection to the masses. Nevertheless, they contributed by breaking the 
taboo of criticising or even insulting Mubarak personally.137 This became extremely important 
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136 Interview with Abdallah el Senawy in Cairo. 26.03.2013.  
137 Elsawaf Hassan. The Real Sory of the Egyptian Revolution. Cairo 2012. P. 46-47.   
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when the opposition later developed into a mass-movement. These political factors made a 
deep impact on the workers’ movement and the CTUWS.    
 
Like the Kefaya, workers organised by the CTUWS in Mahalla al Kubra and elsewhere had 
an important role in breaking this taboo as well. By the early 2000s the local CTUWS branch 
had a significant presence in Mahalla. The demonstration in 1988 was not the only 
example.138 The two big strikes in 2006 and 2008 became recognised as a prelude to the 
revolution in 2011. One of the most important youth movements in the 2011 revolution were 
the 6th of April Movement. The name 6th of April is a reference to the 2008 strike at Ghazi al 
Mahalla, which started at this date. The last of these two strikes escalated into street battles 
that lasted for several days and only ended after the police got reinforcements from other parts 
of Egypt as well as the army.139  
 
One important expression of the CTUWS’ activism in the late 2000s was the drafting of a 
new law on labour rights. This draft law was released on the 8th of March 2009 by the 
CTUWS in collaboration with other labour activists. This document became a sort of manifest 
for the workers’ movement in Egypt. It was an attempt to reform the labour law from 1975. 
The law was amended several times, but always in the direction of more restrictions  
according to the workers of Mahalla al Kubra.140 The perspective of the organisation is made 
very clear in the draft law. Activists from Mahalla al Kubra, Hilwan and 10th of Ramadan 
City were involved in this work. The draft law became very important when it came to form 
actual demands towards employers and the state.141  
 
When the revolution started on the 25th of January 2011 there was a lot of uncertainty and 
rumors about what was happening. The only certain thing was that there were large 
demonstrations in Downtown, but it seemed like the authorities were in control up until the 
28th of January. This was the day when protestors overran the barricades set up by the riot 
police, crossed the bridges over the Nile and joined the peaceful protestors at Tahrir 
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139 Interview, conducted by the author, with Gamal abo el Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in 
Mahalla al Kubra. January 2014.  
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Square.142 The scale of the uprising was unprecedented since the late 1940s and the year 
leading up to the 1954 revolution.     
 
One of the most violent clashes between protestors and police during the revolution took 
place in front of the Maspero building on the 28th of January.143 The Maspero building is the 
old radio and television central built in 1960 and where Al Jazeera had their main office in 
Cairo there before the revolution. It was important to the protestors to take this area in order 
to be able to enter Downtown and Tahrir Square. It was between Tahrir Square and the 
Maspero building that the police had made their barricade. The police set up another barricade 
between Tahrir Square and Qasr al Nil Bridge to stop protestors coming from this direction. 
The police charged at the protestors coming from the Maspero building and managed to push 
the crowd back. These protesters were mostly young students and activists who were 
unaccustomed to street fighting. The police broke through their lines and the protesters started 
to flee. What happened next was a decisive moment in the revolution. If the police had 
managed to stop the demonstrations here it is likely that they would have stopped the 
revolution.  
 
Just at this point protesters from the Giza side of the river Nile started arriving and joined the 
protester under attack by the police. The bridges linking the West bank of the Nile to the East 
bank where Tahrir Square is located were full of people. The people living on the Western 
bank of the river are mostly working class. These protestors were more experienced in violent 
resistance to the police and all the years of oppression and brutality suddenly had an outlet. 
The violent elements and working class protesters complemented the majority of the 
demonstrators, who were largely peaceful. The revolution needed people who were prepared 
to use violence against the police. It is not likely that the peaceful demonstrators would have 
been able to hold Tahrir Square until Mubarak resigned if the violent elements hadn’t joined 
them. 
 
During the revolution in Egypt in 2011 several groups that were experienced in fighting the 
security forces aligned with the ordinary peaceful demonstrators and protect them. For a short 
time period society was turned up side down. Groups that usually operated outside the public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Live rapport of the 28th of January uprising on Al Jazeera English. As viewed 25.02.2014.  
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143 Daily News Egypt: reference to the Maspero building. As viewed 10.05.2014. 
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discourse like the ultras became central for the development of the revolution.144 They joined 
the protestors in fighting the riot police and actually successfully helped occupying Tahrir 
Square. 
 
Ultras in this context were violent football supporters who had become politicised because of 
their hatred towards the police. Sub-cultures connected to football clubs are a complex 
phenomena that can be found in many countries, but in Egypt football matches were one of 
the few arenas where more than just a small group could get together. This means that 
football matches were another important forum for the development of civil society. In the 
revolutionary situation in January and February of 2011 the expertise of the Ultras in clashes 
with the police became relevant and important for the development and sustaining of the 
mass-movement. Violence specialists became important, both on the side of the regime and 
on the side of the revolutionaries.  
 
The term is derived from the concept of monopoly on legitimate use of violence by the state 
developed by the 19th century sociologist Max Weber.145 Weber’s theory is grounded in the 
assumption that as societies develop the need for a clearer division of labour, and thereby for 
specialists, becomes greater. Gradually a demand for all kinds of specialists grows. A class of 
professional warriors gets or takes the monopoly on the use of physical violence. In modern 
nation states this is usually military and police forces. In Weber’s view this was a way for a 
society to limit the general use of physical violence and to contain it.  
 
However there are circumstances where other violence specialists challenge the state’s 
monopoly on violence. This is supported by the political scientist Paul Brass who says:  
 
“Although most people everywhere are capable of committing acts of violence under a variety 
of circumstances, the kinds of violence that are committed in ”communal riots” are, I believe, 
undertaken mostly by ”specialists” who are ready to be called out on such occasions, who 
profit form it, and whose activities profit others who may or may not be actually paying for 
the violence carried out.”146      
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In the scenario of the Egyptian revolution in 2011 this was exactly what happened in the 
streets of Cairo. There were three types of violence specialists present. First there were the 
two traditional types as described by Weber, namely the military and the police. In the initial 
phase of the revolution the military kept their distance and appeared hesitant to choose 
between the people and the regime, before they finally appeared to decide to support the 
demonstrating crowds at Tahrir Square and throughout Egypt. The police, especially the riot 
police were the active violence specialists that protected the regime and the status quo. The 
riot police are usually young cadets deployed to unfamiliar parts of Egypt and given shields 
and helmets without much training. In addition there are riot police units that specialise in 
dispersing groups of demonstrators and these units take orders directly form the Ministry of 
the Interior. On the 28th of January the police were engaged in fighting with demonstrators.  
 
On the side of the protestors there were violence specialists even if the international media 
focused on the peaceful demonstrators on Tahrir Square. Protestors who were more familiar 
with street fighting and clashes saved the peaceful demonstrators from being beaten by the 
riot police.147 In the strike wave between 2003 and 2009 the there were several brutal clashes 
between workers and the police. Some of the fiercest of these clashes were in Mahalla al 
Kubra like the one on the 6th of April 2008. These clashes had taught the workers how to 
build barricades, make Molotov cocktails and how not to be crushed by charging riot police. 
Together the violent and the peaceful demonstrators were strong enough to force the police to 
withdraw from the streets of Cairo.  
 
According to David Mansley’s book on collective violence and riot policing, the American 
sociologist Charles Tilly has explored the concept of Weber by conducting extensive research 
on the different ways the nation states has used the monopoly on legitimate use of violence. 
He says that however terrible violent crowds get, it is the professional violence experts who 
always do the most harm to human lives. Violent mobs and civilian protest movements 
usually do the most harm to private and public property, but lives are rarely lost until the 
police and the army shows up. Mansley argues that Tilly shows that throughout history the 
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professional violence specialists, who have monopoly on legal use of force, perpetrate almost 
all the killings of people during civil disturbances.148 
 
The workers’ movement were veterans in agitating for better rights and conditions. In the pre-
industrial era these workers were largely farmers and peasants, but as an industrial proletariat 
were developed during the course of the 20th century they inherited the oppositional role that 
the peasants had held before. Both before and after the industrial era different Egyptian 
regimes have turned to violence to supress demands of better living conditions. This forced 
the workers’ movement to become more militant than other groups in society. Workers cannot 
be classified as violence specialists alongside professionals like the military or the police, but 
the conclusion is that the experience they gained in fighting the security forces through 
decades of oppression gave them an advantage when the revolution came. 
 
The Centre for Trade Unions and Workers Services is a workers’ organisation, but it is not 
unique in its practices. Several other organisations carry out similar practices on the grass root 
level. Fighting for better living conditions and providing services and help to the groups they 
are working for are central for all the organisations in this thesis.  
 
Key	  individuals	  in	  the	  Centre	  for	  Trade	  Unions	  and	  Workers	  Services	  
The CTUWS is run by mediators that have more power that the rest of the members. 
Mediators appear to dominate the organisation, particularly in the central office in Cairo that 
deals with the national issues of the workers’ movement. Leaders like Kamal Abbas and 
Fatma Ramadan can be described as mediators because their main function is to establish 
useful networks both in Egypt and abroad. They have an overview that the local leaders of the 
branch offices lack.  
 
Workers who live in Cairo come to the office in Garden City to ask for advice and help. This 
gives Abbas and Ramadan a position of power in relation to the workers they are supporting. 
They do not go around out and look for workers that need help, instead the workers have to 
take time off from their jobs to come and ask mediators like Fatma Ramadan for the services 
the CTUWS provide. Local leaders like Gamal abo al Alaa and Ibrahim Hamdi in Mahalla al 
Kubra also serve as mediators for the workers and assist with grass root issues.  
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The CTUWS does not appear to take advantage of this position of power to disfavour of the 
workers, but the organisation have received some critique for being to far removed from the 
workers on the grass root level. This is because the CTUWS works on two different levels. 
The national organisational level and the local grass root level. The CTUWS Mahalla 
certainly participate in strikes and demonstrations, but the central office in Cairo mostly deals 
with legal matters like improving the labour laws and introducing minimum wages on the 
national level. The role of Fatma Ramadan is especially important in the CTUWS. Ramadan 
is an educated and resourceful person who campaigns for workers’ rights in Egypt. She is also 
in a powerful position because she has skills the workers lack. The workers have to come and 
visit her in Cairo when they need help from the CTUWS to organise campaigns and strikes. 
She is the mediator that can support the workers and communicate their message to society in 
general.    
 
On the other hand she is not a wealthy person and, as with the other people that worked in 
organisation, she often did not received a salary from the CTUWS. The organisation often had 
money problems and had to prioritise supporting the workers. Fatma Ramadan is an idealistic 
person and strongly believes in workers’ rights. To her, this is more important than earning a 
lot of money, which she could surely get if she worked somewhere else.  
 
The CTUWS fulfilled two important roles in the labour movement. On the one hand they 
provided the day to day services locally in helping the workers getting their rights and on the 
other hand they ran campaigns to challenge the authority of the ETUF the state controlled 
union and to change the labour laws of Egypt. Formally, the CTUWS is not a trade union. 
They are an NGO campaigning for workers’ rights, but because of the poor performance of 
the ETUF they had to step in and fill the gap. In other words they did the job of a trade union 
without officially being one. 
 
The CTUWS co-drafted a new union law that would legalise the foundation of independent 
unions as a direct opposition against the ETUF in 2009.149 This was not just a draft to reform 
the laws concerning unions in Egypt. It also became a manifest that made the political agenda 
of the CTUWS clear. During the conference that led to the publication of the union law draft, 
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the leaders of the CTUWS met with government officials. This conference shows that the 
CTUWS sees itself as a leader of the labour movement and that it has the right to represent 
the workers in dealings with the government. This report is an example of the fact that the 
organisation has had ambitions to change the Egyptian society on the national political level 
as well as they did the grass root activism for and together with the workers. 
Education	  provided	  by	  the	  Centre	  for	  Trade	  Unions	  and	  Workers	  Services	  
Educational activities were particularly important for the CTUWS. In the early years, between 
1990 and 2006 when the organisation became more involved with the mass movement. 
During these years the CTUWS focused their official activities on legal representation of 
workers, while organizing different types of underground actions in workplaces and factories.  
 
The CTUWS arranged some courses publically and some secretly.150 They organised courses 
about civil liberties, labour laws, political activism and passive resistance according to veteran 
labour activist Said Habib.151 It was the passive resistance courses that were secret because 
this was a revolutionary practice aimed directly at the police and the regime. The CTUWS 
taught passive resistance to the workers at Mahalla al Kubra to give them a means of self-
defence against the police. The principles of the independence movement in India led by 
Mahatma Ghandi in the late 1940s, the Civil Rights movement from the USA of the 1960s 
and the Solidarity Workers Movement in the 1980s were among the inspirations that the 
CTUWS drew on to create these courses.152 In this environment civil society was able to 
grow.     
 
The education provided by the CTUWS was a product of their political activism. In order to 
activate the revolutionary potential in the working class they wanted to increase the workers’ 
knowledge about workers rights and political activism. According to veteran activists in 
Mahalla al Kubra the courses taught by the CTUWS were necessary to get the workers 
involved in strikes and demonstrations in the early 2000s.153 After the violent army response   
to the striking workers in Mahalla al Kubra 1988 the strikes died out. Workers from Mahalla 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Interview with Gamal abo al Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in Mahalla al Kubra. 
January 2014.  
151 Said Habib in interview with Al Ahram Weekly in the 29 May - 4 June 2008 issue, No. 899.   
152 The Solidarity Movement in Poland was a strike movement that turned into a political mass-movment against 
Soviet domminace in the 1980s. Later its leader Lech Walesa became the first president of independent Poland.    
153 Interview with Gamal abo al Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in Mahalla al Kubra. 
January 2014.  
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al Kubra and other important industrial areas feared going to the streets and organising 
strikes.  
 
To address this fear the CTUWS had to offer courses on human rights, workers rights and 
how to organise strikes without getting killed. The workers soon realised that as long as they 
did not mention the name of the President Mubarak they were safe. They could criticise and 
attack the economic policies of the government as long as they did not attack the president. 
This realisation also spread in the emerging civil society and was relevant for building up the 
mass-movement momentum.  
 
During most of the 1990s the CTUWS had had great difficulty in getting large numbers of 
workers to join them, but in later the activists in Mahalla al Kubra were able to convince the 
workers that they would not get killed if they participated in strikes. In other words they had 
to win the workers over in order to be able to organise the large demonstrations in the 2006 
and 2008 that were preludes to the revolution in 2011. The peaceful aspect of the revolution 
in 2011 drew inspiration from the workers’ movement and their experiences with passive 
resistance strategy.       	  
Aid	  and	  Services	  Centre	  for	  Trade	  Unions	  and	  Workers	  Services 
The CTUWS provided many kinds of services that can be described as aid or support. The 
most important support in the early years was legal aid. Lawyers like Youssef Darwish 
represented workers that were being harassed, displaced and fired illegally. Another important 
service the CTUWS provided was to support strikes and campaigns publicly. In the 1990s it 
was almost impossible to do so, because of repression from the police.154 But as the militancy 
of the workers grew in the early 2000s campaigns for better wages and working conditions 
became more visible in the public domain. The CTUWS was a major supporter to most of the 
workers’ campaigns during these years. Not only with symbolic support in the media but, also 
with practical support like providing housing for strike meetings in their offices and 
equipment like access to computers and printers to make pamphlets.  
 
The CTUWS managed to get health insurance for most of their members. This is a major 
issue for Egyptian workers. There is no guarantee that the employer will get them health 
insurance. The Ministry of Manpower and Migration (MOMM) is in charge of monitoring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Interview, conducted by the author, with Gamal abo el Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in 
Mahalla al Kubra. January 2014.  
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that the labour law is being upheld. They have around 2000 inspectors all over Egypt who are 
supposed to make sure that health and safety regulations are being upheld, and also to report 
on illegal child labour. However they are not very efficient in carrying out inspections and 
they lack the authority to make sanctions on the employer after the implementation of the new 
labour law in 2003.155 Therefore the CTUWS led campaigns for getting health insurance in 
companies both in the public and private sector.  
 
In addition to getting health insurance to most of the workers it represents, the CTUWS also 
provides cheap food and commodities to workers in the local branches. This type of 
cooperative help is provided in the following way: All the members of the CTUWS Mahalla 
pay a small membership fee, and some of this money is put aside in a food account and a gas 
account. At regular intervals the CTUWS buys in large supplies of flour and gas that are 
redistributed to the members at a considerable discount. In other words the CTUWS organises 
sales cooperatives for the members so they can afford the most basic commodities.156      
Funding	  the	  CTUWS	  
According to Fatma Ramadan the members themselves fund the CTUWS.157 However, 
according to Kamal Abbas the CTUWS received some money from a Dutch labour rights 
foundation in 1995.158 It was this money that paid for the opening of branch offices in 
addition to the original one in Hilwan. The CTUWS expanded to other industrial areas like 
Shubra, Nag Hamada, Ramadan City and Mahalla al Kubra.  
 
According to the webpage of the CTUWS it received the French Republic’s Human Rights 
Prize in 1999 which gave it international recognition and support.159 The publicity the 
CTUWS got as a result of the French prize was important because it started to receive funds 
from foreign labour foundations and unions. These funds were used to start the production of 
a monthly newsletter named Workers Speech160, which was distributed by the CTUWS in 
factories, and in working class neighbourhoods. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Beinin Joel. Justice for all – The Struggle for Workers Rights in Egypt.  P. 94-95. Washington DC 2010.  
156 Interview, conducted by the author, with Gamal abo el Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in 
Mahalla al Kubra. January 2014.  
157 Interviews by the author with Fatma Ramadan. March 2013 and January 2014. Cairo.  
158 Interview with Kamal Abbas by the Workers Adivce Centre. Published on their website 14. March 2009. 
http://www.wac-maan.org.il/en/article__53/egypts_workers_on_the_move  
159 Interview with Kamal Abbas by the Workers Adivce Centre. Published on their website 14. March 2009. 
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The funds the CTUWS have received form other countries have been sporadic and only used 
to expand the practices of the organisation in specific ways. The day to day work of the 
CTUWS was funded by the members of the local branches like the one in Mahalla al Kubra 
Therefore, the workers are hesitant to speak about funding form the other countries or 
foundations, or played down its importance.161   
 
All the local branches work more or less independently from the central national office in 
Cairo. These local branches are well connected to the workers on the grass root level and 
most of the members are workers. Ibrahim Hamdi and Yaser Sakkah are both proud to be able 
to introduce themselves as workers at Ghazl al Mahalla.162 They emphasized that it was the 
workers that organized the CTUWS Mahalla and denied that professional activists ran the 
organisation for the workers.  
 
The activists work every day at the factories and when the day is done they join union 
meetings in the evening. The working day at the factory ends at 4 pm. It is unfortunate that 
the workers and activists at the CTUWS were so reluctant to talk about funding from other 
organisations, but the need to emphasize their own struggle and that were funded locally must 
be understood.  
 
In the 2003 the government engaged in a new privatisation strategy and it sold public 
enterprises to private investors. This meant that in the early 2000s there was quite a lot of 
money in the public treasury and the government could use this money to pay off the workers 
in order to end strikes and protests. In many of the strikes in the 2000s the workers got 
substantial financial gains both in the form of lump sums for ending protests and promises of 
increased wages. Even if economic demands usually were met, the government did not accept 
political demands.  
 
According to Joel Benin the largest strike wave since the late 1940s took place between 2003 
and 2009. More then 2 million workers, from both public and private sectors, participated in 
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162 Interview, conducted by the author, with Gamal abo el Alaa, Ibrahim Hamdi, Yaser Sakkah and Said Habib in 
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strikes in this period.163 The CTUWS participated in and supported strikes on both the 
national level and on the local level. When the revolution started on the 25 of January 2011 
several workers’ strikes were already in motion before the large demonstrations started. On 
the 10th of February there was a general strike in Egypt and on the 11th of February Hosni 
Mubarak stepped down from office.  
 
The	  CTUWS	  after	  the	  revolution	  
The revolution was a great victory for the workers’ movement. On the 30th of January 2011, 
in the middle of Their Square, the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) 
was founded. One of the founding organisations was the CTUWS. This was the first legal 
independent trade union in Egypt for decades. In the time that followed it became clear that 
the different organisations were not as unified as the revolution has led them to believe. In the 
summer of 2011 the CTUWS withdrew from the EFITU to return to organise workers locally.  
 
During 2012 and under the government of Muhammed Morsi, the EFITU became an 
important voice in the opposition against the government. This changed after the SCAF took 
over after toppling Morsi on the 3rd of July 2013. The chairman of the EFITU, Kamal Abu el 
Eita, was appointed Minister of Manpower in the army-backed government headed by the 
Prime Minister Hazem el Beblawi. The EFITU lost much of its popularity during the summer 
of 2013 because their members began to doubt its independence. According to Joel Beinin the 
CTUWS formed an alternative to the EFITU called the Egyptian Democratic Labour 
Congress (EDLC) on the 24th of April 2013.164          
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Chapter	  3:	  The	  Association	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  
the	  Environment	  (APE)	  	   
The Association for the Protection of the Environment is an Egyptian NGO that works with 
and for the Zabbalin community of Manshiyat Nasser in Cairo. The APE was founded by and 
is run by wealthy Copts, and the mostly Coptic Zabbalin are the people that benefit from the 
services the organisation provides. The founders were the French nun Soeur Emmanuelle, the 
environmentalist Mounir Namatella and the politician Yousriya Loza Sawiris. Soeur 
Emmanuelle was known as “the Mother Theresa of Egypt” according to Nicole Assaad.165  
The APE was founded in 1984.  
 
Manshiyat Naser was a slum in the early 1970s when the Soeur Emmanuelle started working 
there. It was only after the APE appeared that the conditions improved. Soeur Emmanuelle 
worked at Manshiyat Naser until 1993 when she returned to France. She died in Paris in 2008, 
99 years old. Niccole Assaad is a retired Frenchwoman who has lived in Egypt for most of her 
adult life. She now works as a volunteer at the APE and is the main source to the APE in this 
thesis. The APE provided funds and built the recycling plant in Moqattam so that the Zabbalin 
could improve their recycling enterprises. The processing of recycling trash became safer and 
more environment friendly. To a large extent the APE also became a provider of social aid to 
the poor Zabbalin. In addition to helping with the actual work, they built houses, opened 
schools and health clinics, and campaigned for women’s rights in the community. The APE 
can be seen to have been important for the development of civil society among the Zabbalin.  
In many ways the APE became a safety net for the Zabbalin and provided many services one 
would expect from a well functioning trade union. 
 
The Zabbalin have usually worked without contracts, insurance or safety equipment and they 
do not have access to any kind of union membership. It was not until the Cairo Cleaning and 
Beautification Authority (CCBA) were opened in 1984 that the Zabbalin officially got the 
right to collect garbage in Cairo, but after an assessment of the value of the waste, the 
privilege was taken away form the Zabbalin and given to a private company called Misr 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Interview by the author with Nicole Assaad. March 2013. Manshiyat Naser, Cairo. 
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Service. They regained the privilege to collect garbage only after the APE had launched a 
successful campaign against the CCBA.166 
 
In many cases the activities of the APE matches those of the CTUWS. Like the CTUWS, the 
APE arranged health insurance, legal documentation and education for the Zabbalin. 
According to Nicole Assaad, the APE had to act as a trade union because there was no union 
that represented the Zabbalin.167  
 
The APE adopted several union-like practices when they started their organisation in 1984, 
just like the CTUWS. They addressed very different people, but they were forced by need and 
circumstances to engage in similar types of practices. The only legal trade union in Egypt 
before the revolution in 2011 was the state controlled Egyptian Trade Union Federation. 
However, the ETUF was no functioning like a union for the workers, instead it tried to 
prevent that the workers got better working conditions.168 Therefore the CTUWS was set up 
to give the workers basic services so they could organise themselves. The APE had much the 
same role in Manshiyat Naser for the Zabbalin. Nobody offered the Zabbalin basic services 
before the APE were established.169  
 
After the revolution in 2011 the APE continued their activities in the Manshiyat Naser. 
According to Yousriya Loza Sawiris the APE noticed a decline in the demand of the products 
they produce.170 This was because of the general decline in the economy and that the domestic 
costumers of the APE had less money than they had before the revolution. In addition people 
are usually more afraid of investing money in times of political crisis. After the election in 
2012 when Mohammed Morsi became president the APE and the Zabbalin community 
became anxious that a Muslim Brotherhood dominated government might make things 
difficult for Coptic communities and organisations. Therefore they supported the 
demonstrations and the military intervention against the government in the summer of 2013. 
APE’s activities in Manshiyat Naser were mostly unaffected by the political troubles since the 
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revolution. The reason for this was that the health clinics and schools were largely ran by 
volunteers and second generation Zabbalin who did not have to travel far for work.171      
Key	  individuals	  in	  the	  Association	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Environment	  
The differences between the providers and the recipients of services in the APE are greater 
than in the CTUWS. The organisation was supported and protected by the Sawiris family 
since its foundation. Yousriya Loza Sawiris was a member of the Egyptian parliament 
between 1995 and 2000 and she was a board member of many important international and 
Egyptian committees.172 Loza Sawiris is a person who can negotiate with the state and 
international organisations, getting money from the Ford foundation, while she is involved in 
the activities in the garbage city at Manshiyat Naser. She functions as a mediator like Fatma 
Ramadan in the CTUWS but she is also the most traditional patron in this thesis. Her 
motivation for doing this work is to be recognised as a charitable person who gives back to 
her own people. The Zabbalin are Copts like the Sawiris family and there exists a symbolic tie 
between them. The tie that exists between the rich Copts in the Sawiris family and the poor 
Copts of Manshiyat Naser is both one of ethnicity and of social solidarity.  
 
Other mediators in the APE are the members of the organisation that are involved in 
development programs in Manshiyat Naser. They are nurses and teachers that work giving 
basic services to the Zabbalin. In many cases the Zabbalin are dependent on these APE 
workers to access basic medical care. The organisation is in a position of power, because it 
has access to funds and skills that the Zabbalin do not have on their own.  
 
The APE was the first organisation that opened projects in Manshiyat Naser. Since the 
foundation 30 years ago the APE has become a family run organisation. Many of the day-to-
day leaders are second-generation volunteers and children of Zabbalin themselves. In many 
ways it can be described as a grass root organisation, because Zabbalin or their families have 
a strong say in the organisation. It is fair to say that civil society has had good condition for 
growth in Manshiyat Naser. The potential of power abuse in the APE is diminished because 
of the close ties between providers, mediators and the recipients of services.    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Interview by the author with Nicole Assaad. March 2013. Manshiyat Naser, Cairo. 
172 The Women and Memory Fund website: reference to Loza Sawiris. As seen on the 19.02.14. 
http://whoisshe.wmf.org.eg/expert-profile/yousriya-loza-sawiris  
	   76	  
The recipients of services provided by the APE are the Zabbalin and the other poor people 
that live in Manshiyat Naser. They often receive life saving services from the APE and thus 
they feel that they owe the organisation a certain debt. The APE is an organisation the 
Zabbalin need in order to sell their products to international and domestic markets. It is the 
organisation that has access to the networks of costumers that are interested in buying the 
artwork, the compost and the machinery the Zabbalin make. It is also the APE that owns 
much of the equipment and the localities where the products are made. The paper factory in 
Manshiyat Naser is placed right next to the headquarter office of the APE. All this gives the 
APE a powerful position in relation to the people they are helping. Even if the help is real and 
contributes to the betterment of conditions in Manshiyat Naser there is an element of 
patronage between the organisation and the people they are working for.  
Education	  provided	  by	  the	  Association	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Environment	  
The Association for the Protection of the Environment had two types of educations that they 
provided for the Zabbalin. Firstly they had schools for children and adults living in Manshiyat 
Naser, and secondly they gave education in modern recycling techniques to the adults. They 
encouraged the women at Manshiyat Naser to go to school and to get paid work both within 
the community and outside.173 Womens’ rights have been one of the most important causes 
for the APE since its foundation in 1984. This is perhaps one of the main areas of civil society 
involvement and development in Manshiyat Naser.    
 
In the early years the APE had to convince the local leaders of the Zabbalin community to 
send their women to school and work. In Egyptian society it is considered a virtue for women 
to be able to stay at home and not have to go out to work. This is not just because of 
patriarchal domination, but many women prefer to be home if they can afford it, even if her 
husband allows her to work.174 According to Nicolle Assaad, the APE workers had to fight 
with tradition for several years before they managed to convince the local leaders that it 
would be for the benefit in the community if the women were able to get an education go out 
to work.  
 
The education provided by the APE is the best organised and most professional type of 
education among the four organisations. The APE has been running permanent schools in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Interview by the author with Nicole Assaad. March 2013. Manshiyat Naser, Cairo. 
174 For more information about this issue see the book of Atiya Narya. Khul-Khaal  Five Egyptian Women tell 
their stories. 1982. 
	   77	  
Manshiyat Naser since 1989. The focus has been on literacy classes for both children and also 
adults who never went to school. These courses are based on the education model Learn and 
Be Liberated from Caritas, the development organisation of the Catholic Church. 175  
According to the APE’s webpage the education provided has resulted in high levels of literacy 
among in Manshiyat Naser, especially among the young in the community.   
 
The education offered by the APE is quite different from the education the CTUWS provided. 
The CTUWS provided education that the workers needed to be able to organise opposition 
activities against the government and the state controlled Egyptian Trade Union Federation. 
The APE did not teach political activism, but they offered more basic education like reading 
and writing. However the APE did, like the CTUWS, teach human and legal rights. This was 
a much more political act, because it enabled the Zabbalin to raise their own demands and 
fight for their rights. According to Nicole Assaad the Zabbalin did not know what rights they 
had before the APE started to teach about these matters.176 This education was a significant 
for the way civil society was able grow in Manshiyat Naser. In Egypt the public and the 
private education sectors do not have the capacity to reach all the groups that want and need 
education. This is why all the different organisations in this thesis provide some kind of 
education and see themselves as educators to the people they are helping.   
Aid	  and	  Services	  provided	  by	  the	  Association	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Environment	  
The APE also provides basic aid and support to the Zabbalin. The most important type is 
health services that they offer in Manshiyat Naser. The APE opened a health clinic for women 
and children in 1995.177 They also started a vaccination campaign against Hepatitis in 2006. 
Hepatitis B is a problem directly connected to the work of the Zabbalin. They collect hospital 
waste like used syringes and bandages. They bring the waste to the recycling site and the 
women get the job of sorting the plastic and the metal material. The metal is cleaned, melted 
and resold and the plastic is recycled. This practice is dangerous for the women who do the 
sorting and the risk of getting infected with Hepatitis B is severe.178 In addition the APE also 
put emphasis on natal health and contraception to improve women’s health in the Zabbalin 
community.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Webpage of the APE. Under the sub-section Programs. http://www.ape.org.eg/ChildProtection.html  
176 Interview by the author with Nicole Assaad. March 2013. Manshiyat Naser, Cairo. 
177 Webpage of the APE. Under the headline: History of the APE. http://www.ape.org.eg/History.html    
178 Webpage of the APE. Under the headline: The Programmes. http://www.ape.org.eg/HealthSupport.html  
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The APE helped the Zabbalin to get health insurance, just like the CTUWS did for the 
workers. One difference is that the Zabbalin usually are informal labourers, while the workers 
at factories or in offices are formal wage labourers. The Zabbalin have less rights than 
workers that are employed in the public sector like the workers in Mahalla al Kubra.  
 
Another important service the APE could offer was to help the Zabbalin to get official 
identity cards. Before this the Zabbalin were paperless people.179 Without an ID card it is 
almost impossible to get any kind of services from the state bureaucracy. That means, no 
pension, no social benefits or not even a birth certificate for a child. The right to identity 
papers has been included in the UN charter of human rights, but remains an unresolved 
problem in many countries. However, the APE helped many Zabbalin in obtaining ID papers. 
Without this help it would have been impossible for the mostly illiterate Zabbalin to fill in all 
the necessary forms. Not to mention they would not have known where to address themselves. 
 
The Zabbalin lacked the education and practical knowledge about formal matters needed to 
get help in many instances. The Zabbalin share this problem with many groups from the poor 
classes in Egypt. Illiteracy and the lack of proper education have been and still is a major 
problem. However, when it comes to recycling and waste management the Zabbalin are 
among the best in the world. They have even sent recycling experts from Manshiyat Naser to 
Western cities like London and New York as waste management consultants.180       
Funding	  the	  APE	  
The APE was able to fund much of their practises by their own income generating programs. 
The APE produces and markets several products that generate income, which benefit the 
Zabbalin. They sell compost, recycling machinery, recycled paper, rugs, artwork and fashion 
items to name some examples. The famous American fashion designer Marc Jacobs started 
selling bags designed and produced at Manshiyat Naser in his shops internationally after a 
visit to the APE.181 
 
In addition to the money the APE earn by selling its own products, it also receives funding 
from a wide variety of organisations. The World Bank, US Aid, Apache Oil, Embassy of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Interview by the author with Nicole Assaad. March 2013. Manshiyat Naser, Cairo. 
180 Ape.org: as viewed 18.02.2014. Under the headline Income Generating Projects. 
http://www.ape.org.eg/BriefIntro.html  
181 Ape.or. as viewed 18.02.2014. Under the headline Income Generating Projects. 
http://www.ape.org.eg/BriefIntro.html  
	   79	  
Japan, Embassy of Denmark, Embassy of Finland, Ford Foundation, Sawiris Foundation, 
Walid Ibn Talal Foundation and the Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development 
are just some of the foundations and companies that has supported the APE with donations 
and grants.182 To put it into perspective: The Walid ibn Talal Foundation is run by the Saudi 
prince with the same name and they support development projects around the world. The 
Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development is one of the largest charity 
organisations in the world. The Coptic Sawiris family is one of the richest in Egypt and they 
have been instrumental in the foundation and the funding of the APE. The APE is by far the 
wealthiest of four organisations in this thesis.  
The	  APE	  during	  the	  revolution	  and	  after	  
The APE supported the Zabbalin when they demonstrated against the regime of Hosni 
Mubarak. In the middle of the 2003 the government gave the monopoly on collecting waste in 
Cairo and other cities in Egypt to a company called Misr Services. The only problem was that 
this company came in direct competition with the Zabbalin. This caused tension and the 
Zabbalin protested. In an attempt to control the Zabbalin the government ordered in 2008 the 
slaughtering of all the pigs in Manshiyat Naser.183 The pigs were both important in the 
processing of waste and an important source of food for the Coptic Zabbalin so they 
demonstrated against giving up their pigs. The loss of the pigs was a disaster for the Zabbalin 
and they have had a grudge against the government ever since this incident. The culling of the 
pigs was supposedly in order to hinder the spreading of the swine flu epidemic that hit many 
parts of the world this year. Much more likely was this an attempt to make it more difficult 
for the Zabbalin to do their work. So when the revolution started in January 2011 both the 
Zabbalin and several key members of the APE joined in and demanded the downfall of the 
regime together with the rest of the protest movement. However, the military intervened in 
Manshiyat Naser unlike in Tahrir Square and the other places where protests were held at this 
time.184 Civil society had prospered in Manshyiat Naser at least partly due to the continued 
work of the APE, and the military decided it necessary to stop this protest whereas they let 
others carry on elsewhere. It may also have been an element of discrimination against the 
Coptic population here, as suggested by Nicole Assaad.185  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Webpage of the APE as viewed 18.0214. Under the headline Institutional. 
http://www.ape.org.eg/GrantsAndDonations.html  
183 Interview by the author with Nicole Assaad. March 2013. Manshiyat Naser, Cairo.  
184 Interview by the author with Nicole Assaad. March 2013. Manshiyat Naser, Cairo 
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In 2012 when Mohammed Morsi was president the Zabbalin that worked with the APE and 
the Coptic population in general were anxious and demonstrated against the Brotherhood and 
the government. After Morsi was toppled and the army took over on the 3rd of July 2013, the 
Zabbalin and the Coptic community became ardent supporters of the transitional government 
and minister of defence General al Sisi.  
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Chapter	  4:	  The	  Democratic	  Front	  Party	  (DFP)	  
The DFP was a liberal, democratic and progressive political party. The party was founded by 
Osama al Ghazali Harb in 2007. During his time at the University of Cairo he became a 
socialist and in 1972 he was charged with being a member of an illegal organisation called 
The Arab Pioneers that was in opposition to the regime. He was involved in the Bread Riots 
in 1977 and again he was arrested. After this incident al Ghazali Harb left politics to continue 
his studies and later his academic career.  He made a comeback to politics in 1995 and was 
appointed as a member of the Shura Council by President Mubarak.186 In 2002 he became a 
member of the Politburo of the ruling NDP. 187 He resigned from the policies committee in 
2006 and later he founded the DFP. In 2010 the DFP became one of the major supporters of 
Mohammed el Baradei’s campaign for democratic reform.188 After the revolution the party 
merged into the Egypt Block with two other parties and since than it more or less ceased to 
exist as an independent political party. 
 
Joseph Nessim was the leader of the Cairo branch of the DFP and most of the information 
about the party in this thesis comes from him. Even if the political party to some extent has 
disappeared it still continues to do social work. The DFP, like the CTUWS and the other 
organisations in this thesis provided practical services to poor people in Cairo. The party 
taught illiterate people to read and write as well as raising awareness about human rights and 
democracy, and it was a part of the emerging civil society. As the party became revolutionary 
in 2011 it also gave courses in political activism and passive resistance.189  
 
In 2010 the DFP joined the campaign supporting the presidential bid of Mohammed el 
Baradei. After the revolution the party leader al Ghazali Harb stated that he wanted the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to rule the country for two years in order to 
oversee the transformation of the state towards democracy and the reestablishment of the 
police force that had disintegrated after the revolution.190 In the parliamentary election he 
supported the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood and joined the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Shura Council: Upper House in the Parliment of Egypt.  
187 Politburo: The committee in charge of the day to day policies of the party.  
188 Al Ahram Online: Osama El Ghazali Harb Who’s who – Elections 2011. As viewed 10.05.2014. 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/33/102/26709/Elections-/Whos-who/Osama-ElGhazali-Harb.aspx  
189 Interview by the author with Joseph Nessim. March 2013. Cairo.  
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Democratic Alliance for Egypt. In August 2012 the DFP joined the Egypt Bloc with the 
Dostour Party among others.191 The Egypt Bloc was a very short-lived alliance and in 
September of the same year it was dissolved. The DFP had difficulty combining being a 
democratic, liberal party and supporting the SCAF and military intervention at the same time. 
It had to navigate the political terrain of post-revolutionary Egypt by joining and leaving 
several different political alliances in the years between 2011 and 2013. When the 
government of Mohammad Morsi was in office the party was in active opposition against his 
government and joined both violent and peaceful protests in front of the Muslim Brotherhood 
headquarters in Moqqatem, Cairo.192  
Key	  individuals	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Front	  Party	  
The Democratic Front Party had mediators like the other organisations. Leaders like Joseph 
Nessim had a stronger voice in the party than the regular members. Most of the members of 
the DFP were young men and women in their mid-twenties, and several were students. They 
had been politicised during the revolution and were keen to remain engaged in politics. 
According to Nessim there was no point in participating in politics before the revolution 
because the president and his close associates made all decisions of importance.193 Additional 
motivations for joining the party was that the members had a forum for communicating 
political ideas, the opportunity of networking and a sense of social belonging. This is a good 
example of the political apathy that was dominant in Egypt before the revolution, and how 
civil society had more breathing space immediately after the revolution.   
 
In addition to being a leader in the DFP, Joseph Nessim was also a member of the Egyptian 
Engineer Syndicate and the owner of his own engineering company. He had a good education 
from Australia and this gave him an advantageous position in comparison with most of the 
members who were students at Egyptian universities. His position in the party office in 
Downtown Cairo was central and people would come and seek his council if they needed 
anything. At a party meeting his chair was in the middle of the room where he enjoyed the 
attention of the other members. He was not in a central position in the party, but he was the 
local leader who could take care of important day-to-day issues. At the party meeting the 
other members present were sitting around the room, but the focus of everyone’s attention 
was on Joseph Nessim. There seems to have been a relatively weak egalitarian tradition at 
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192 Interview by the author with Joseph Nessim. March 2013. Cairo.  
193 Interview by the author with Joseph Nessim. March 2013. Cairo.  
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their party meetings even if the party was run in a democratic manner. The way an 
organisation conducts meetings can say a lot about its internal social hierarchy.  
 
The chairman of the party, Osama al Ghazali Harb, was also a kind of mediator. His power 
and prestige came from his experience as a politician.194 Even if he has been associated with 
the Mubarak era, he maintained and reinforced his role as an opposition figure by splitting 
from the National Democratic Party and by supporting Mohammed al Baradei before the 
revolution in 2011. He knew how to communicate both upwards in the political system and 
downwards to his own party members and clients.  
 
According to Joseph Nessim the DFP believed in building democracy by lifting the standard 
of living of the poor people. This could be seem as a noble policy, but it could also be seen as 
a way to obtain loyal supporters of the party. The DFP viewed itself as a leading force in the 
development of democracy in Egypt and for this reason they taught the poor about human 
rights and democracy. What they actual thought the poor is unclear, but they had an interest in 
portraying the DFP as a good party and the Muslim Brotherhood as the main adversary of 
democracy in Egypt.     
Education	  provided	  by	  Democratic	  Front	  Party	  
The Democratic Front Party put a lot of emphasis on education. In my interview with Joseph 
Nessim he told me that the DFP used to arrange something they would call a Freedom 
Festival, which was the umbrella term for their social work. Even the name “Freedom 
Festival” shows something of the mood in civil society around the time of the revolution. 
Every Friday members of the party went to slums and other poor areas in Cairo to teach the 
poor about human rights and democracy.195 Like the CTUWS, the party also taught people 
about civil disobedience and passive resistance.  
 
The Democratic Front Party provided a different kind of education than the CTUWS and the 
APE. The DFP went to the slums with big cars and caravans and provided basic education on 
the spot to whoever happened to come by. These schools were provisional and run by 
volunteers. They had a political function because they were also giving basic courses about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Al Ahram Online: Internet article called Osama El Ghazali Harb Who’s who – Elections 2011. As viewed 
10.05.2014. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/33/102/26709/Elections-/Whos-who/Osama-ElGhazali-
Harb.aspx  
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democracy in practice. According to Nessim some of the topics taught were on how to vote, 
how to voice a political opinion and about international conventions signed by Egypt.196 Even 
if the education offered by the CTUWS and the APE is quite different from the DFP it is 
important to note that all the organisations in this thesis work with education in some fashion.     
Aid	  and	  Services	  provided	  by	  the	  Democratic	  Front	  Party	  
Another aspect to the Freedom Festivals was the giving of aid and support to the less 
fortunate. They provided food, clothes and blankets during the winter months.197  The 
temperature drops to under 10 degrees Celsius in Cairo in winter and without sufficient 
shelter and clothing people actually freeze to death. Like the APE they also offered basic 
reading and writing education and helped the poor getting access to health services. 
According to Joseph Nessim helping the poor was just as important as being part of a political 
process when talking about building democracy in Egypt in the long run.198 
 
The recipients of the DFP services were poor people living in slums and deprived areas. The 
DFP took their Freedom Festivals to the general public in those areas.199 In return this 
demographic category was expected to support the party and its candidate in future elections. 
In this sense the DFP and its recipients had a more traditional Patron/Client relationship in 
that there was a kind of exchange of services and loyalty. 
Funding	  the	  DFP	  	  
According to Joseph Nessim, rich Egyptian businessmen who were opposed to the Muslim 
Brotherhood funded the Democratic Front Party in the first couple of years.200 Some of them 
were Coptic and others were liberal secularists. This is an example of both Copts and 
secularists were concerned about a move towards a more Islamic political direction in Egypt. 
The media tycoon, Naguib Sawiris, was the most famous financial supporter of the DFP. The 
APE and the DFP were both partly funded by the Sawiris family. Yousria Loza Sawiris, the 
mother of Naguib Sawiris, was on the governing board of the APE and the Sawiris 
Foundation was one of most important supporters of this organisation.  
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199 See Chapter 4.  
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Regarding the key individuals, the focus here is not on the exchange of goods or services in 
return for political support on the one hand and loyalty on the other. The exchanges in these 
organisations are more subtle and of a more symbolic nature than the direct link between 
goods and services and political support. This classical type of patronage is an important 
factor in political practice in Egypt, but it is not the focus of this thesis. Several politicians are 
famous for this kind of practice as a way of buying votes in general elections.201 Usually this 
is seen as some kind of corruption, but it is not necessarily seen like this in Egypt. The 
exchanges from the sponsors’ point of view are about being seen as a generous person who 
gives back to the less fortunate.  
The	  DFP	  during	  and	  after	  the	  revolution	  
The DFP was involved in protesting since its foundation in 2007. Even the name is 
revolutionary, “the Democratic Front Party” suggests that there is a war waging and it has a 
front that needs to be defended. The DFP was firmly placed in the anti-Muslim Brotherhood 
camp. Some of the reason for this may be that several key individuals were Copts. The DFP 
did not define itself as a Coptic party, but it had many Coptic members and this influenced the 
party’s political orientation. Joseph Nessim told me quite openly that: “Our main enemy in 
Egypt is religious extremists like the Muslim Brotherhood. We must get rid of their 
dominance over religion and politics. They are like a plague that destroys democracy. Egypt 
is in a slow burning war with the Brotherhood”.202  
 
Nessim says that in the last general assembly of the Engineering Syndicate, in where he 
participated, the election of a new executive board was aborted when fistfights erupted 
between the MB dominated leadership of the syndicate and some of the members who viewed 
themselves as secular and liberal. Nessim admitted that the syndicate was lost to the MB and 
he started to focus his political energy on the Democratic Front Party. It provides a secular, 
Coptic perspective. Even if the Muslim Brotherhood is considered to be a moderate religious 
group in the West, among most secularists in Egypt the Brotherhood is seen as extreme 
fundamentalists.203 Politicians like Nessim did not care about political correctness in this case. 
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202 Interview by the author with Joseph Nessim. 20.03.2013. Cairo.  
203 Bbc.com: reference to strong anti-Brotherhood sentiment in the newsline as viewed the 06.05.2014. 
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He clearly labelled the Brotherhood as a plague that poses a very serious threat to the vision 
of a democratic Egypt.204  
 
The DFP was involved in most of the big demonstrations in the late 2000s and during the 
2011 revolution. It was involved in the Coptic movement and several party members were 
injured in the Maspero massacre on the night between the 9th and the 10th of October 2011. 
The DFP was not a Coptic party, but in many cases it did support groups that fought for 
Coptic rights. Several of the members were Copts like Nessim even if they Muslims and 
secularists were members as well. 
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Chapter	  5:	  The	  Salafiya	  Costa	  Movement	  (SCM)	  
The SCM describes itself as a social movement that tries to build bridges between the 
different religious communities the Egypt. Salafism is a direction of Islam that wants to return 
to the practices of the early Muslims during the lifetime of the Prophet Mohammed. Salafists 
are not a singular entity, but they have several views and opinions. It is a political view that in 
order to organise society in a better way one needs to go back to the roots. Most of the Copts 
are orthodox, but there are also Catholic and Protestant Copts.  
 
The Salafi Mohammed Tolba and the Copt Bassem Victor founded the SCM after the 
revolution in 2011. Together they witnessed a unity of the religions during the 18 days on 
Tahrir Square. They were inspired to work to solve some of the problems between Muslims 
and Christians. Both Salafists and Copts faced harassment in society and this brought the two 
groups closer when they created the SCM. The Salafiya Costa Movement also provides many 
services to the poor in addition to the ideological work. The members go to the slums of Cairo 
to provide different types of services for the poor.205 The SCM is organised in several 
committees like the Street Committee and the Freedom Committee. Like the all the other 
organisations discussed in the thesis the SCM provides education, aid and services to the 
people it is helping. The SCM is interesting because it combines this union-like practice with 
its ideological work, which is to build bridges and diminish tensions that exist between 
different religious communities in Egypt.      
 
The Salafiya Costa Movement was started during the revolution in 2011. It both supported 
and joined the protests at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of the revolution. Soha Ali 
explained that the SCM has nothing against the Muslim Brotherhood, but that it was against 
the government of Mohammed Morsi.206 This was because the government did not meet the 
demands of the people at Tahrir Square during the revolution and because they tried to 
heighten the religious tensions in the country. Civil society can sometimes work across the 
religious divides and therefore may contribute to reducing sectarianism, and this is precisely 
the mission of the SCM. Despite criticising the government the SCM was one of the 
organisations that were invited and participated in the constitutional committee during 2012 
while other groups boycotted it. The SCM withdrew from politics on the 12th of August 2013 
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206 Interview by the author with Soha Ali and Bassem Victor in the SCM. March 2013. Cairo.   
	   88	  
after the government of Morsi was toppled, but it continued with the social work and aid to 
the poor. 
 
On the 27th of November 2013 the Salafiya Costa Movement posted a statement on Facebook 
saying that the state repression against human rights was so harsh that the country was being 
pushed towards a second revolution.207 This was a clear and explicit political statement, but 
after that the Facebook page went silent and there have been no more statements. This 
happened at the same time as several other organisations closed down their social media 
platforms due to increased violence between security forces and demonstrators. These 
platforms mostly addressed themselves to the younger generation who had been the main 
participants in the revolution, and for them the revolution was not over. This withdrawal from 
public debate can be seen as a part of the fragmentation of the mass-movement that happened 
especially after the military took over in July 2013.  
Key	  individuals	  in	  the	  Salafiya	  Costa	  Movement	  
In the SCM the mediators were all paying members and volunteers and in theory there should 
be no difference in power relations. However, the mediators, in the capacity of their personal 
prestige, enjoyed special respect and power in the organisation. The founders Mohammed 
Tolba and Bassem Victor were the official leaders of the SCM and because of this they could 
speak on behalf of the organisation.208 Soha Ali was also a mediator in the SCM because she 
was better educated than the other members. She also had a good job as a student consultant 
at the American University of Cairo while many of the members in the SCM were students or 
unemployed.  
 
The point in differentiating between the key individuals and the other members in the Salafiya 
Costa Movement is to exemplify the internal power structures within the organisation. 
Historical literature is full of mediators and local patrons and shows how powerful their 
positions have been in Egyptian society and still are in many cases. These key individuals or 
mediators can be found in all the organisations in this dissertation. This is the case in the 
egalitarian workers’ movement as well. With the way Egypt is organised one is completely 
dependent on key individuals to get anything done. A key individual like Bassem Victor holds 
a kind of authority that makes the SCM able to participate in civil society and communicate 
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with different organisations, parties and government agencies. This is due to his personal 
character, his education and his network of contacts. 
Education	  provided	  by	  Salafiya	  Costa	  Movement	  
The Salafiya Costa Movement is organised in different committees. The Street Committee 
and the Freedom Committee are in charge of the direct services provided by the SCM in poor 
neighbourhoods. The committees provide schoolbooks and teach both children and illiterate 
adults. Many of the members in the SCM are university students who give lessons in reading, 
writing and basic maths. The educational work seems to be just as important as the food aid 
also provided by the SCM.  
 
Education was and is still an important practice for the Salafiya Costa Movement. Even after 
the SCM withdrew from engaging explicitly with civil society it still continued with civil 
society development through organising the education work in the slums. This service is very 
important because many poor people need an alternative education program outside the 
regular school system. Many children have to work to support their families during school 
hours and therefore they need to be able to access lessons in the evenings. The flexibility is 
also key with the adult education projects that the SCM runs.209  
 
The type of education offered by the SCM differs from the CTUWS and the APE in some 
particular ways. The CTUWS went to factories and workplaces and gave courses in political 
activism, the APE opened traditional evening schools for children in Manshiyat Naser, while 
the SCM sat up provisional schools in the slums. The schools run by the APE have 
professional teachers and proper facilities. The SCM schools are more basic than the APE 
schools because they are run by volunteers and they teach people from the back of vans and in 
coffee shops. This could be an indication that civil society has gone underground again since 
the disintegration of the mass-movement.  
Aid	  and	  Services	  provided	  by	  the	  Salafiya	  Costa	  Movement	  	  
The SCM is organising aid and support for poor people in the slums of Cairo. It collects food 
and clothes that shops cannot sell and distributes to the poor. According to Soha Ali and 
Bassem Victor the SCM has established ties with upmarket shops in Zamalek and Maadi.  
Goods are picked up from these shops and handed out to the poor through the activities of the 
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Street Committee and the Freedom Committee.210 In addition to this basic form of aid the 
SCM also helps the poor with legal and bureaucratic matters like getting ID papers and 
getting social benefits and pensions.  
 
There are several medicine and teacher students that contribute with their skills. They perform 
health checks and give reading and writing lessons to the poor for free. Many of the members 
of the SCM have a lot of socio-cultural capital including higher education and belong to the 
middle classes. The members are not especially rich, but they contribute by offering their 
socio-cultural capital and spare time to the disposal of the Salafiya Costa Movement.211     
 
After the military ousted the government of Mohammed Morsi, and especially after the 
massacre of government friendly protesters on the 14th of August 2013, the SCM grew 
increasingly disillusioned with the political process. The organisations changed its focus from 
engaging in public political debates to developing the Street Committee further. Since then 
offering aid and support for the poor has become the main function of the SCM. Providing aid 
to the poor is crucial in both Coptic Christianity and in Salafism. The practises of the SCM 
thus became something all the members could work on under the overall aim of bringing the 
two religious communities closer together.     
 
The recipients of the aid and services in this thesis are often too poor to worry about the 
relationship between the organisation that helps them and their financiers. They have to 
accept all the help they can get and they are dependent on help to cover their basic needs. The 
difference between the Egyptian context and the traditional Patron/Client model is that the 
sponsors are not dependant on the political support from the recipients to maintain their 
position. This is the case with the recipients who depend on food aid and health services from 
the SCM and the DFP in this thesis. The workers of the CTUWS and the Zabbalin of the APE 
are usually better off than the people living in absolute poverty.  
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Funding	  the	  SCM	  
According to Soha Ali and Bassem Victor, the members funded the Salafiya Costa Movement 
and they did not depend on money from any other groups or foreign organisations.212 The 
practices of the SCM were expensive to manage. However, most of the members of the 
movement were from the middle classes. They were doctors, engineers and teachers, or 
university students hoping to become doctors, engineers and teachers, and it makes sense that 
they could afford to fund the SCM.  
 
Both Soha Ali and Bassem Victor agreed that the SCM did not receive donations or charity 
from any other organisations. They however acknowledged that the SCM received charitable 
donations from private individuals. Both the Salafists and the Copts have a religious duty to 
give charity to the poor and this can be some of the answer to this question. Members or other 
private individuals could fund the educational and the aid programs if they were marketed as 
charity.  
The	  SCM	  after	  the	  revolution	  
The SCM was founded and gained fame during the revolution in 2011. They were inspired by 
and participated in the demonstrations on Tahrir Square during the 18 days between the 25th 
of January and the 11th of February. The members of the SCM witnessed the unity between 
the religious communities in Tahrir Square and it became the most important inspiration of 
the SCM. The goal for members of the SCM like Soha Ali and Bassem Victor was to make 
the religious unity during the revolution into a permanent situation in Egyptian society as a 
whole.213 Even if the vision of the SCM was a harmonious one, they had a revolutionary 
perspective. The organisation gained its popularity because of the revolutionary situation in 
2011. This is reflected in a disparity between rhetoric and practice within the SCM. Even if 
Soha Ali and Bassem Victor put a lot of emphasis on building bridges between religious 
groups, other members of the SCM had a conflict perspective. These members joined anti-
Brotherhood protests and fought alongside other revolutionary groups like the revolutionary 
socialists and the liberal youth movement. This is a clear revolutionary perspective and it is 
interesting to note both these radically different perspectives were thriving side by side in the 
same organisation.  
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The SCM was good at differentiating between its function as an organisation and the actions 
of the members as individuals. As an organisation it seemed to agree on principles of non-
violence and dialogue, but as individuals the members could be both revolutionary and have 
very different beliefs. The founders, Mohammed Tolba and the Victor Bassem, were previous 
members of the Kefaya Movement and some of the younger members I spoke to were 
supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. Usually Salafists and members of the Brotherhood 
disagree fundamentally on a number of issues, for example whether true believers shall 
participate in politics or not. Salafists usually advocate a withdrawal form politics, while the 
Brotherhood has developed into a movement with a very political profile. However, there is 
great variety within the movements and there are directions within each of the groups that 
disagree with the mainstream.   
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Conclusion	  
Strikes	  and	  demonstrations	  after	  2011	  
People from all the organisations in this thesis participated in demonstrations against former 
president Hosni Mubarak. This engagement was seen as a form of help and support from the 
perspective of the organisations and the recipients. The thesis shows that before the revolution 
there was a slow build up to a mass-movement against the rule of Hosni Mubarak. In the 
beginning there were only some small groups that started protesting and it was not until the 
revolution had begun in January 2011 that large numbers of people joined the movement.  
 
After the revolution, the mass-movement disintegrated whereas civil society did not. The 
different civil society groups and organisations went back to fighting for their own special 
interests instead of working together trying to change society as part of a mass-movement. 
The specific organisations discussed in this thesis went back to their familiar ways of 
organising activities. They all had more space to organise and participate in practical and 
political activities in their respective communities. On the one hand they were fighting for the 
rights of a particular interest group, like workers for example, and on the other hand providing 
services like food aid and basic education for the same group. The mass-movement that 
caused the revolution and toppled a regime fell apart before its demands were met, but there 
may have been pragmatic reasons for this. It makes a lot of sense to work on the local, micro 
level in a society where the problems seem so great and deeply rooted. Fixing the big issues is 
an enormous task so socially engaged people choose to do what they can for a small group 
instead.  
 
During the time of mass-mobilisation in the revolution all these different groups came 
together by the fact that they had a common enemy in the government of Hosni Mubarak. 
After Mubarak stepped down some of the revolutionaries continued to fight the SCAF and the 
interim government while others felt that the revolution was over and went back to work to 
their own individual remits. The same phenomenon repeated itself when Mohammed Morsi 
became president. Some revolutionary groups continued to fight the police and the 
government while others decided to support the new regime. The people that chose to comply 
with the government labelled the groups that kept on fighting as troublemakers.  
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The fragmentation was even more dramatic after the 30th of June revolution and the military 
coup against Morsi on the 3rd of July 2013. The fragmentation developed further this time 
because now religion had become a more serious factor of division. In addition most people 
supported the coup and only the most loyal supporters of the government of Morsi remained 
militant and protested until they were shot upon by the military on the 14th of August 2013. In 
this brutal operation up to 638 people were killed and up to 4000 were wounded according to 
the Ministry of Health.214 The supporters of the deposed government of Morsi claimed that 
many more were killed than the official numbers indicated.  	  
Aid	  and	  services 
Neither of these organisations are formally recognised as trade unions. Nevertheless they 
provide services one would expect from a functioning trade union. Therefore it is reasonable 
to call the services union-like practices. Although the APE, the DFP and the SCM have little 
or nothing to do with the workers’ movement they end up engaging in similar forms of aid 
and services as the CTUWS.  
 
In order to gain support among the people they serve, all the organisations in this thesis have 
to offer some practical services to their respective communities. It is expected of a community 
or charitable organisation that they provide certain types of help and support. This is partly 
because the Egyptian state falls short when it comes to take care of the basic needs of the 
population. In many ways the aid and services provided by the organisations are similar. The 
CTUWS are providing basic aid as well as legal support and education to workers both 
locally and on the national level. The APE are providing access to essential medicines, as well 
as assisting the Zabbalin with formal issues like getting ID papers. Both the DFP the SCM 
provide fundamental aid to the poor people living in the slums of Cairo. These two 
organisations provide more basic aid and could be said to focuses less on enabling the 
recipients to take care of themselves in the long run. On the other hand both organisations are 
engaged in empowerment issues and this is directly linked to the continued development of 
civil society. These poor recipients live under worse conditions than the both the workers and 
the Zabbalin.  
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Education	  
Education was something that the four different organisations highlighted as particularly 
important. They all provided types of education that was specialised to match the needs of the 
people they were helping. The CTUWS organised courses aimed at achieving better 
understanding of labour law and international labour rights among the workers. The APE 
provided education that the Zabbalin needed, specialising in education for women. The DFP 
and the SCM provide more similar education than the CTUWS and the APE. Both these two 
organisations arrange evening schools for poor children and adults in the slums. It is only in 
the evenings that the poor have time to attend school, as they have to work during the day.  
These two organisations operate from a conviction that only by lifting the living conditions of 
the poor can Egypt achieve freedom and democracy.    
Key	  individuals	   
There are two kinds of key individuals in this thesis. The first kind is sponsors that support the 
organisations with funding. In return they are seen as virtuous individuals with a good sense 
of social conscience in the communities. These key individuals have been be described as 
sponsors in each of the chapters about the four organisations. Naguib Sawiris is a good 
example of this kind of sponsor. The second kind of the key individuals is people who had 
important positions within the different organisations and thus had access to networks and 
resources that ordinary members lacked. These key individuals are described as mediators in 
each of the chapters. Fatma Ramadan is a good example of this kind of key individual. She is 
a person who can talk with workers seeking aid and support as well as sitting down with a 
state committee and put forward the workers’ point of view.  
Civil	  Society 
The reason the CTUWS, the APE, the DFP and the SCM are discussed together is because 
they are all examples on the development and growth of a sustainable civil society in Egypt. 
Civil society in Egypt has been seen as marginal in comparison with the state apparatus or the 
economic institutions like investors and banks. Civil society in this thesis is the public spheres 
between the state, the market and the individual. That means organisational life, charitable 
ventures, religious establishments and trade unionism to mention some. In the decades leading 
up to the revolution there was increasing activity in the organisational life, predominantly on 
the grass root level and in the workers’ movement, but also on the national level. The 
development of a civil society was necessary to organise substantial opposition against the 
regime. It was this foundation that made the revolution in 2011 possible.  
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After the revolution when the crowds left Tahrir Square, civil society found other spaces for 
continued growth. In a way that had been impossible before, coffee shops, underground art 
fora, workers’ meeting places and street projects like the Freedom Festival became spaces 
where civil society could develop. Spaces like these had been there since before the 
revolution, but possibly due to less state surveillance, people had more room to be critical and 
talk freely in public. Another reason could be that before the revolution it was illegal to gather 
in groups of more than five and now this law was no longer upheld as strictly as it had been 
previously.  
 
The mediators in the organisations in this thesis have in common that they have the 
knowledge and ability to negotiate with several power structures in society. This can be the 
state, financial sponsors, or other organisations or networks in civil society. Their position 
bridges several roles in different power structures. The organisations need these mediators in 
order to function as civil society actors.   
 
The regular members and activists of the organisations also need to be taken into 
consideration. They are the ones that actually perform most of the services provided by the 
organisation. Their positions are not as powerful as the sponsors or the mediators because 
they do not have access to the funds nor the networks needed, but they are just as important 
for the performance and reputation of the organisation.  
 
The classic forms of patronage is less relevant in this thesis because the recipients of services 
do not see themselves as clients and there are no expressed allegiances of loyalty between 
them and the mediators. In addition the goods and services are given because the people 
involved think that improving the lives of the poor is a prerequisite for democracy. In other 
words, ideology is at the core of the aid work not the need for political support. However, it is 
useful to have the classical patronage model as a background while describing the formal and 
informal power structures within the organisations in this thesis.  
Main	  findings	  from	  each	  chapter	  	  
This thesis consists of two main parts. Part one contains an introduction and research question 
as well as a detailed historical background about the development of the workers’ movement 
in Egypt. Part two contains comparisons between four different Egyptian organisations. The 
	   97	  
CTUWS is the most central organisation in this part because of its significant role in the 
workers’ movement. The APE, the DFP and the SCM are relevant in this part because they 
share similar practises with the CTUWS. The thesis starts with a prologue where the position 
of the author during the revolution is made clear. The author was present in Cairo during the 
25th of January Revolution in 2011. The events of the 28th of January Day of Rage are 
presented by the author’s eyewitness account.  
 
All main elements and actors in the thesis are presented in the introduction. The situation 
prior to the revolution is described and then the research question is presented. A short 
introduction to the history of the workers’ movement is included here and this is developed 
further in chapter one. The focus on practices instead of rhetoric or ideology gives this thesis 
a new perspective that rarely is accounted for in research about modern Egyptian history. 
Traditional historical research on the workers’ movement and civil society in Egypt tends to 
talk about strikes and the conflict with the regime. To look away from the explicit politics and 
focus on the actions and practices makes in possible to show that there are major similarities 
between the different organisations. In practice all the organisations act as unions for the 
people they are trying to help. These are also crucial spaces for the emerging civil society. 
 
Chapter one is a detailed historical account of the development of the workers’ movement in 
Egypt from late Ottoman times until today. The chapter is divided into specific time periods 
from 1882 until 2013. The main point of this chapter is to show how each of the Egyptian 
regimes since early industrialisation in the 19th century sought to bring the working classes 
under control. Another important point in the chapter is to show how the workers have met 
this challenge from the state and how they have fought for the right to organise and better 
living conditions. To come closer to the reality for the actual workers in each time period one 
major incident from each era is discussed. The 1967-68 Riots, the 1977 Bread Riot and the 
1988 Anti-Mubarak strike at Mahalla al Kubra all marked the workers’ movement in different 
ways and paved the way for the revolution in 2011.  
 
Chapter two contains detailed discussions about the Centre for Trade Unions and Workers 
Service. The CTUWS is the most important organisation in this thesis and therefore it is given 
more space that the other three. The main findings in this chapter is the story of how and by 
whom the CTUWS was founded, how the organisation grew and developed and most 
importantly how the Mahalla al Kubra branch is organised locally and what the activists here 
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did in the underground leading up to the revolution. The CTUWS runs sales cooperatives to 
make sure that the workers can afford basic commodities, they provided specific kinds of 
education that became relevant for the workers participation in political activism in the 
revolutionary setting. Lastly key individuals like Fatma Ramadan and the local leaders in 
Mahalla al Kubra play a fundamental role in the performance of the organisation. The 
organisation has mediators that have important networks both internally and externally. 
Without these key individuals the organisation would be unable to engage and participate in 
civil society.  
 
Chapter three contains a presentation of the Association for the Protection of the 
Environment. The foundation of the APE as a support organisation for the Zabbalin in 1984 
and the role of financial sponsors such as the Sawiris family are some of the important points 
in this chapter. The main point with the chapter is to illustrate how the APE performs some of 
the same functions for the Zabbalin as the CTUWS for workers. The two different 
organisations share common practices in their daily activities and these are education, aid and 
services. The reason why they provide these specific services is that there is a great need for 
them among the people. Poverty, lack of education and basic commodities are among the 
most severe problems in Egypt generally, but also especially for the workers in the CTUWS 
and the Zabbalin of the APE. 
 
Chapter four contains a similar presentation of the Democratic Front Party and a comparison 
with the other organisations in this thesis. The main point presented in this chapter is that 
even if the DFP is a political party and a very different kind of organisation than the CTUWS 
and APE they practise the same functions for poor people in Cairo. These functions are 
education, aid and services. It is interesting to see how political action and basic aid is mixed 
in this way in the DFP. This is a common trend with many Egyptian organisations.  
 
In chapter five the Salafiya Costa Movement is presented and compared with the three 
previous organisations. The conclusion of this chapter is that the SCM, like the APE and the 
DFP in the previous chapters, provides similar services to the people they are helping. Again, 
the SCM is a very different organisation from the others in this thesis, but they provide 
education, aid and services. The main difference in the practices between the DFP and the 
SCM and the APE and CTUWS is the level of participation among the recipients of services 
in the organisations. The SCM is the only organisation that was founded during the revolution 
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in 2011, the other three where founded before the revolution. Therefor this chapter contains a 
part about happened with the SCM after the revolution. One important finding with the DFP 
and the SCM is that both of them ceased to exist in their original form after the military coup 
in 2013. Nevertheless, they continued providing education and aid to the poor as distinctive 
groups.   
 
The first objective of this thesis has been to highlight the role of the workers’ movement in 
the modern history of Egypt and to show how important it was in the opposition that led to the 
25th of January revolution in 2011. The second objective has been to show how the workers’ 
movement exemplified by the CTUWS engaged in practices that were similar in many ways 
to other civil society actors even if these actors officially were completely different. This has 
led me to the conclusion that offering aid and services to people are necessary for any civil 
society organisation if it wants to be taken seriously in Egypt. The types of services provided 
by civil society actors are determined by the needs of the people. It seems like some of the 
fear that had dominated Egyptian society had been lifted and replaced by a new degree of 
freedom and defiance on the streets at grass root level. Civil society and the workers’ 
movement can be said to be linked together in their continued work for a better Egypt. 
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